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ABSTRACT
Since Max Weber, there has been an active debate on the impact of religion on people’s
economic attitudes. Much of the existing evidence, however, is based on cross-country studies in
which this impact is confounded by differences in other institutional factors. We use the World
Values Surveys to identify the relationship between intensity of religious beliefs and economic
attitudes, controlling for country fixed effects.  We study several economic attitudes toward
cooperation, the government, working women, legal rules, thriftiness, and the market economy. We
also distinguish across religious denominations, differentiating on whether a religion is dominant
in a country. We find that on average, religious beliefs are associated with “good” economic
attitudes, where “good” is defined as conducive to higher per capita income and growth. Yet
religious people tend to be more racist and less favorable with respect to working women. These
effects differ across religious denominations. Overall, we find that Christian religions are more
positively associated with attitudes conducive to economic growth.
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Economists, sociologists, and political scientists have long been interested in 
explaining the economic success of certain countries and the persistent poverty of others. 
In search of the ultimate cause, an obvious role has been suggested for religion. There is 
hardly an aspect of a society’s life that is not affected by religion. Why shouldn’t it affect 
a country’s ability to produce efficiently and grow?  
Max Weber (1905) was the first to identify the significant role that religion plays 
in social change. He went as far as to state that the Protestant Reformation triggered a 
mental revolution that made possible the advent of modern capitalism.  
  Almost a century after Weber’s seminal work, the importance of religion in 
explaining the prosperity of nations seems to be experiencing a rebirth. While scholars 
prefer to avoid correlating religion directly with economic prosperity, they try to relate it 
to fundamental institutions that have been shown to be conducive to growth. In his study 
of development across Italy, for instance, Putnam (1993) attributes the prevailing lack of 
trust toward others in the South to the strong Catholic tradition, which emphasizes the 
vertical bond with the Church and tends to undermine the horizontal bond with fellow 
citizens. In a cross-country study, both La Porta et al. (1997) and Inglehart (1999) find 
some evidence for this theory. On a similar note, Landes (1998) attributes the failure of 
Spain to develop in the 16th and 17th century to the culture of intolerance diffused by the 
Catholic Church, which forced some of the most skillful people out of the country. 
Finally, Stulz and Williamson (2001) attribute the low level of creditors’ protection 
present in Catholic countries to the anti-usury culture pervasive in the Catholic tradition.  
  Unlike Weber, most of these authors provide compelling evidence in favor of 
their claim, showing a robust correlation between a country’s main religion and these  3
institutions. Such evidence, however, can be interpreted in two ways. One possible 
interpretation is that there is something intrinsic to certain religions, such as Catholicism, 
that makes them inimical to the development of talents and institutions that foster 
economic growth. An alternative interpretation, which is equally consistent with the 
results, is that there was something in the past (correlated with religion, but not 
necessarily religion) that trapped a country in a bad equilibrium. According to this 
interpretation, there is nothing fundamental, but it is hysteresis that keeps a country 
trapped in this equilibrium. A possible variation of this hypothesis, which is 
observationally equivalent to the previous one, is that there were some aspects of a 
religion, in this case Catholicism, that were inimical to the development of certain 
institutions, for example trust, but that these aspects disappeared over time, possibly 
because of a reform.  
While the difference between the two hypotheses seems rather uninteresting from 
a historical point of view, from a policy perspective it is very important. If the first 
alternative is true, then short of changing a country’s religion (a task beyond the power 
even of the World Bank), there is very little hope for bringing prosperity to many poor 
countries. By contrast, the second alternative provides some hope. It is sufficient to find a 
coordinating device to escape the bad equilibrium trap without trying to change people’s 
religious beliefs.   
Unfortunately, the existing cross-country analysis cannot distinguish between 
these two hypotheses. To identify the effect of religion separately from the effect of other 
historical accidents, we have to resort to a within country analysis. Such an analysis 
cannot be conducted in one country alone, because the role of a religion might depend  4
highly upon the social and historical context in which it developed. To address this issue 
in this study, we use a dataset containing data on individuals for a large set of countries. 
The World Values Survey is actually a collection of surveys administered to a 
representative sample of people in 66 countries from 1981 to 1997. These questionnaires 
contain information not only about religious affiliation, but also about the intensity of 
beliefs (frequency of attending religious services) and how the interviewee was raised 
(religiously or not). Thus, we are able to study the relation between the degree of 
religiosity and the type of religion on a series of fundamental societal attitudes that have 
been shown to be conducive to higher productivity and growth. 
We analyze the relation between religion and six groups of variables: people’s 
attitudes toward cooperation, women, government, legal rules, the market economy and 
its fairness, and thriftiness. As measures of attitudes toward cooperation, we use 
individual responses to questions regarding how much one trusts other people in general 
and how tolerant individuals are toward neighbors of different races and/or countries. As 
measures of attitude toward women, we use responses to a variety of questions ranging 
from who should get a job first, a man or a woman, when jobs are scarce; whether men 
should have priority in obtaining university education; and whether both men and women 
should contribute to household income. As measure of attitudes toward the government, 
we use individual responses on how much people trust the government and other 
government institutions. As measures of attitude toward legal norms, we use individual 
responses regarding trust of the legal system and willingness to break the law, including 
cheating on taxes, avoiding a fare on public transportation, or paying bribes. The World 
Values Survey asks people to state their position along the efficiency versus equity trade  5
off. The interviewer shows a card to the respondent in which there are two opposite 
statements at the extremes of a 1 to 10 interval. The respondent chooses the number that 
best describes his or her relative position. Questions range from whether people think pay 
inequality is necessary to provide better incentives to whether competition brings out the 
worst in people or stimulates hard work and new ideas. Finally, to measure people’s 
attitudes toward thriftiness, we use responses to a question concerning whether it is 
especially important to instill the “virtue” of thriftiness in children. 
To isolate the effect of religion from other confounding effects, we control for 
country fixed effects and several individual characteristics: health status, age, sex, 
education, income, and perceived social status.  
We find that on average religion is associated positively with attitudes that are 
conducive to free markets and better institutions. Religious people trust others more, trust 
the government and the legal system more, are less willing to break the law, and are more 
likely to believe that markets’ outcomes are fair. The relation between religiosity and 
market mechanisms (incentives, competition, and private property) is more mixed. On the 
negative side, religious people are more intolerant and less sympathetic to women’s 
rights.    
  The aspect of religion that is associated with economic attitudes is different 
across the intensity of religious beliefs. Trust toward others is associated mostly with 
religious participation, not religious upbringing. By contrast, intolerance is mostly an 
outcome of being raised religiously. Active churchgoers are not more intolerant toward 
immigrants than the rest of the population (but not less either) and they are less  6
sympathetic to women’s rights. Finally, both a religious upbringing and active religious 
participation increase trust toward government institutions.     
We find that different religions have different effects on people’s attitudes.   
Participation to religious services increases trust only among Christians. The effect is 
zero or even negative for other denominations. Within the Christian family, the effect is 
stronger for Protestant than for Catholics, as suggested by Putnam (1993).  
The relation between religion and intolerance is present in all religious 
denominations. The only exception is Buddhists who are more tolerant than non-religious 
people. Hindus and Muslim are the less tolerant towards immigrants and other races, 
followed by Jews, Catholics and Protestants. The point estimates for Protestants and 
Catholics are very similar, while based on previous studies one would have expected less 
tolerance from Catholics (Landes, 1998). Active participants in any religion trust the 
government more than non- religious people, with the only exception of Buddhists. The 
effect is stronger for Hindus and Muslim, weaker for Catholics and Protestant. Similarly, 
all religious denominations are associated with a more conservative attitude toward 
women. However, the effect is much stronger for Muslims.  
Judaism has the strongest negative impact on the willingness to cheat on taxes, 
followed by Protestantism (second), Catholicism and Hinduism (third), and Islam 
(fourth). The ranking changes somehow when it comes to accept a bribe. The strongest 
negative effect is for Buddhist, with Protestants and Muslim next, and Catholics last. 
Protestants are the only religious group that favors incentives. This result vindicates 
Weber’s claims.   7
Religious denominations also differ in their attitude toward private ownership.  
Observant Catholics support private ownership twice as much as Protestants, while 
Muslims and Hindus are strongly against competition. Finally, with the exception of 
Buddhists, religious people of all denominations are more inclined to believe that poor 
people are lazy and lack will power. The effect is stronger for Protestants than Catholics.  
Overall, we find that Christian religions are more positively associated with 
attitudes conducive to economic growth, while religious Muslims are the most 
antimarket. Within Christian denominations, the ranking is unclear: Protestants are more 
trusting and favor incentives more, Catholics are more thrifty and favor private property 
and competition more.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follow. Section I briefly reviews the theoretical 
priors on the economic effects of religion. Section II presents the dataset we use and our 
measure of religious affiliation and attitude toward cooperation, government, legal rules, 
and the market economy.  Section III reports the results of the effects of religion in 
general, while Section IV differentiates across religious denominations. Section V 
concludes.  
 
I. Theoretical Predictions  
An excellent survey of the theoretical debate on the links between religion and 
economic development is provided by Steuart (1998). Without aspiring to be exhaustive, 
we now summarize the main points of this debate.     
  The earliest crucial point was the direction of causality. On the one hand, 
Feuerbach and Marx see religion as a mere reflection of human life. In his Criticism of  8
Hegel's Law, Marx (1844) states: "The grounds of the unreligious critique is man made 
religion, religion does not make man... Religious misery is, by one side, an expression of 
the real misery. Religion is the exhausted creature's sigh, the state of animus of a 
heartless world, the spirit of spiritless situations. Religion is the people's opium.”  
  Weber was of the opposite view. In his classic “The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism,” Weber attributes the emergence of the spirit of capitalism to the 
development of a Protestant ethic. Weber’s Protestant ethic results from the interaction of 
the doctrine of salvation and the concept of good works. It was Luther who decisively 
altered the Christian concept of good works by prescribing the “fulfillment of duties in 
worldly affairs as the highest form which the moral activity of the individual could 
assume” (Weber, 1905).      
  Eisenstadt moves away from an analysis of a direct causal link between 
Protestantism and capitalism to focus on the “transformative potential” of religions. The 
transformative potential refers to the “capacity to legitimize, in religious or ideological 
terms, the development of new motivations, activities, and institutions which were not 
encompassed by their original impulses and views” Eisenstadt (1968). Eisenstadt’s main 
thesis is that Protestantism redefined political and social institutions, and impacted on the 
reformulation of roles within the economic sphere.   
  Eisenstadt’s concept of transformative potential is also useful in assessing the 
potential impact of other religions, such as Hinduism. Given the multiplicity of gods and 
sects, it is very difficult to identify a clear position of Hinduism toward economic 
activity. In particular, the stereotype that portrays Hindu as ascetic and uninterested in the 
material world can be rejected easily. In the Panchatantra we find statements such as  9
“wealth gives constant vigor, confidence and power” and “poverty is a curse worse than 
death” (Uppal, 1986).  Nevertheless, according to Eisenstadt, the highly ritualistic 
behavior promoted by Hinduism is less likely to facilitate the development of more 
systematic efforts in any field of activity.  
  We encounter similar problems when we analyze Islam. While the Sunnah 
prohibits the formation and conclusion of aleatory contracts based on chance (Jomo, 
1992), many verses of the Quaran encourage effort and improvement. Thus, the 
underdevelopment of many Islamic countries cannot be attributed to Islam per se, but is 
possibly due to the development, somewhere in between the ninth and the eleventh 
century, of inflexible political and legal institutions in the Islamic world designed to 
discourage growth values and practices and aimed at preserving the status quo.   
More recently, the debate has focused on the impact of religion on specific 
attitudes that might promote or hamper growth, rather than on differences in the 
Weltanschauung fostered by different religions. Putnam (1993) for instance, focuses on 
trust and claims that the Catholic tradition, which emphasizes the vertical bond with the 
Church rather than a horizontal bond with fellow citizens, has a negative impact on 
people’s average level of trust in others. Landes (1998) focuses on tolerance and claims 
that the culture of intolerance diffused by the Catholic Inquisition negatively affected the 
ability of Catholic countries to grow.  
We follow this more recent literature in considering religious beliefs as low 
frequency variables, based on religious teachings, which affect people’s attitudes towards 
the economic system. These religious teachings do not necessarily reflect the authentic 
message contained in the sacred texts. They simply represent the way certain religion  10
beliefs became crystallized over time and the way they are taught and transmitted from 
one generation to the next. As a result, even if we were willing to interpret in a causal 
way the negative correlation between attitudes towards private property and the Muslim 
religion, we do not want to say that this is Mohammed’s or the Quaran’s fault, but simply 
the effect of the Muslim cultural tradition and the way it has evolved as a result of 
historical circumstances.  
 
Existing empirical studies  
In his survey on the economics of religions, Iannaccone (1998) claims that “the 
most noteworthy feature of the Protestant Ethic thesis is its absence of empirical 
support.” In fact, work by Samuelsson (1993) and Tawney (1926) shows that most of the 
capitalist institutions described by Weber were antecedent to the Protestant Reformation. 
 However, this evidence only rejects the specific channel proposed by Weber, not 
a more general link between the Protestant ethic and the development of a capitalist 
attitude. In fact, in a cross-country study of former British, French, and Spanish colonies, 
Grier (1997) shows that Protestantism is correlated positively with growth and 
development.  
To verify or disprove Weber’s thesis, however, it is necessary to go past the fact 
that the Protestant countries have been more successful economically. This was the fact 
that motivated Weber in the first place, so it cannot be used to test his theory.  
Blum and Dudley (2001) make an important step in this direction. First, they 
refine Weber’s thesis. They argue that Protestantism, by rejecting the Catholic sacrament 
of penance and increasing the individual penalty for defaulting, improved the level of  11
mutual trust and cooperation. Second, they use this theory to explain why wages rose in 
Protestant cities between 1500 and 1750, while at the same time the wages in Catholic 
cities fell.  
The recent literature can be distinguished between macro and micro studies. The 
macro literature focuses on cross-countries studies. La Porta et al. (1997) and Inglehart 
(1999) provide evidence in favor of Putnam’s argument that Catholic countries have a 
lower level of trust. Barro and McCleary (2002) find that economic growth responds 
positively to the extent of religious beliefs, but negatively to church attendance. Finally 
Stulz and Williamson (2001) claim that countries permeated by Catholic culture, with its 
traditional anti-usury bent, tend to protect creditors’ rights less. 
The problem with these studies is that there are too many institutional differences 
across countries and too few degrees of freedom to identify the specific effects of 
religions separately. For example, it is impossible to distinguish whether the ultimate 
effect is due to the country’s main religion or to some other characteristics correlated 
with the beliefs of the dominant religion. Country-fixed effects would solve this 
identification problem, but they cannot be used in this framework. 
  At the micro level, there are several studies on the effects of religion on economic 
outcomes. Religion seems to affect wages (Chiswick, 1983), school attendance (Freeman, 
1986), health (Ellison, 1991), and criminal behavior (Evans et al., 1995). Yet, there are 
problems with these studies. First, there is an issue of endogeneity: “good kids may avoid 
drugs, stay in school, and go to church” (Freeman, 1986). Thus, it is far from clear that 
the correlation is causal. Second, these studies are based on a single country (generally 
the United States). Thus, they can hardly be generalized to other countries. Finally, they  12
focus on the correlation between religion and outcomes, not attitudes. Outcomes are the 
result of attitudes but also of the surrounding environment. For example, ceteris paribus 
Catholics in the United States tend to have higher wages (not as high as Jews, but higher 
than other religions). But this success is generally attributed to the quality of their 
educational system. Thus, it is not necessarily Catholicism per se that makes them more 
successful in life, but rather the interaction between the educational system and Catholic 
Church organizations in the United States. It would be very dangerous, therefore, to 
extrapolate this result to Latin America and to claim for example, that Catholicism would 
have a positive influence on the standard of living there.     
In sum, more than one hundred years after its inception, the debate on the 
economic effects of religion is far from settled. The complexity and variety of every 
religion make it impossible to reach any conclusion on purely theoretical grounds. On the 
other hand, empirical work is plagued by identification problems.  
 
Our Empirical Strategy  
We plan to overcome these problems in the following ways. First, we will control 
for individual country effects, eliminating the impact of other institutional variables. This 
approach runs the risk of underestimating the effect of religion to the extent its impact 
has been absorbed fully in the national culture.
1  Nevertheless, what we find can be 
attributed more credibly to religion.  
Second, we use religious upbringing to identify the effect of religion that is 
independent of individual characteristics, particularly those that are unobservable to us.    
                                                 
1 For example, the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce stated that the Christian tradition has affected the 
Italian culture so much that Italian cannot be considered non-Christian even if they are atheists.    13
Third, we reduce the effect of potentially spurious factors by looking at people’s 
attitudes rather than at their economic outcome. Asking somebody his view on cheating 
on taxes is different from asking him if he has cheated on his taxes. The first question, 
however, is more appropriate for our purposes than the second. The decision of whether 
to actually cheat is affected greatly by the probability of being caught. This is a function 
of a country’s law enforcement, not of an individual’s attitude.  Therefore, looking at 
attitudes is a better way of identifying the effect of religious beliefs on people’s 
preferences.    
In spite of all these improvements, we are well aware of the difficulty in 
interpreting the observed correlations as causal effects. The traditional latent variable 
critique (that a latent variable causes people both to be more religious and to behave in a 
certain way) can be applied even to religious upbringing, as long as we are willing to 
assume that this latent variable can be transmitted from parents to children (either 
genetically or through education). For this reason, we prefer to interpret our results as 
more precisely estimated partial correlations. Even when, to simplify the exposition, we 
will talk about the “impact” of religion, the reader should interpret this as mere 
correlation.   
We choose as our dependent variables attitudes that might have an important 
economic impact.  Our variables can be grouped into six categories; attitudes toward: 1) 
trust and cooperation; 2) women; 3) the government; 4) the law; 5) the market and its 
fairness; 6) thriftiness. We chose the first set of variables because trust and cooperation 
have been shown to be relevant for economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997, Knack 
and Zak, 2001). Also, Landes (1998) claims that intolerance has negative impact on  14
growth. We chose to look at attitudes toward women because of their obvious link with 
the labor market participation decision and thus with a country’s endowment of labor. We 
looked at attitudes toward the government because political instability has been shown to 
be detrimental for growth (e.g. Barro, 1991) and investments (e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 
1994). Attitudes toward the law are important because they affect a country’s law-and-
order tradition, which in turn affects financial development (La Porta et al, 1997) and 
finally growth. One of the variables analyzed here is the attitude toward corruption, 
which has been shown to be detrimental to growth  (Mauro, 1995). Pro-market policies 
are widely believed to favor growth, and Easton and Walker (1997) provide systematic 
evidence for this. Finally, we look at attitudes toward thrift not only for historical reasons 
(Weber attributed the success of Capitalism in certain countries to Protestants’ superior 
thrift), but also because of its importance in the modern theory of growth. 
 
II. The Data  
Description of the World Value Survey 
The World Values Survey (WVS) is a cross-country project coordinated by the 
Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan, under the direction of Ronald 
Inglehart.  Each wave carries out representative national surveys of the basic values and 
beliefs of individuals in a large cross-section of countries. This questionnaire contains 
information about demographics (sex, age, education, etc.), self-reported economic 
characteristics (income, social class), and answers to specific questions about religion, 
political preferences, and attitudes.     15
We use the last three waves that are available (1981-4, 1990-3 and 1995-7). 
Respondents come from 66 independent countries. These countries include almost 80 
percent of the world's population. The coverage of countries varies across surveys. The 
1981-3 survey covered 22 independent countries and Northern Ireland; the 1990-3 survey 
expanded to cover 42 independent countries, Northern Ireland, and greater Moscow; the 
1995-7 survey covered 54 independent countries. 
Being a large and very complex dataset, the WVS suffers from some coding 
problems. Even after implementing all the changes suggested by the codebook, we found 
that a few countries have a distribution of religious denominations that is very different 
from the one reported in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) factbook. To be on 
the safe side, we eliminated these country-years.
2 We might thus be eliminating valid 
observations for countries where the survey weights are very different from the 
population weights. Nevertheless, we think this procedure does not introduce any clear 
bias, while the opposite type of error would.    
We were also forced to drop a few countries because of missing data on some 
other variables that are crucial for our analysis (these countries included Canada, South 
Korea, Pakistan, China, the Czech Republic and Slovakia). The summary statistics for the 
remaining countries are presented in Table 1.  
 
                                                 
2 As a result, we dropped Australia (1,228 obs.) for the 1981 wave; Canada (1,730 obs.) and Nigeria (1,001 
obs.) for the 1990 wave; Taiwan (1,452 obs.), Nigeria (2,767 obs.), Ghana (95 obs.) and the Philippines 
(1,200 obs.) for the 1995 wave. Our only doubt was Finland, where the percentage of Protestant was fine, 
but the percentage of Jews appeared too high. For this reason, we reran all the regressions excluding 
Finland, without appreciable differences in the results.    16
Measures of religious affiliation   
Table 1, Panel A, reports summary statistics of the attitudes toward religion by 
country. The first column reports the percentage of respondents that answered yes to the 
question “Were you brought up religiously at home?” The second and third column 
report the answer to the following question “Apart from weddings, funerals, and 
christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?” The fourth 
column is the percentage of people who answer no to the question “Do you believe in 
God?” 
Table 1, Panel B, reports the distribution of population by religious denomination 
and country. Religious denomination is coded based on the answers to the following 
question: “Do you belong to a religious denomination?  IF YES: Which one?” 
We use the first set of answers to identify the exogenous component of religion, 
the one that does not depend on individual characteristics. To measure the intensity of 
religious beliefs, we use the frequency of attendance at religious services, rather than 
self-declared membership in a religious denomination. Many people who have been 
raised in a certain religion continue to declare that they belong to that religion even if 
they attend religious services less than once a year. We do not regard this as additional 
information with respect to religious upbringing.
3   
Religious denominations differ in the extent to which they prescribe weekly 
attendance at religious services. Our goal, though, is not to measure adherence to a 
precept, but rather exposure to religious teachings. Since people who attend religious 
                                                 
3 In several specifications we have tried and used self-declared membership in a religious denomination 
instead of attendance at religious services at least once a year, as a measure of religious belief. The results 
were very similar.    17
services more are exposed to religious principles more, we use church attendance as a 
proxy for the dimension of religiosity we care about.    
Table 1, Panel C, reports the distribution of the intensity of religious beliefs by 
religious denomination. People who declare themselves Catholic, for instance, attend 
religious services much more often than people who declare themselves of any other 
religious denomination except Hindu. In evaluating the potential impact of different 
religious denominations, we have to take into consideration these systematic differences 
in the intensity of beliefs.     
 
Our dependent variables  
Table 1, Panel D, reports the summary statistics for our dependent variables. All 
of them represent measures of people’s attitudes. We focus on attitudes that have a direct 
impact on economic life. We divide them into four groups.  
 
Measures of attitude toward cooperation  
 
The first group contains measures of people’s attitude toward cooperation. 
Variable 1, which we label trust, is based on the following question: “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful 
in dealing with people?” The variable is equal to 1 if participants report that most people 
can be trusted and zero otherwise. Variables 2 and 3, which we label intolerance toward 
other races and intolerance toward immigrants, respectively, are based on the following 
question: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that 
you would not like to have as neighbors?” (Variable 2: People of a different race; 
Variable 3: The immigrants). Variable 4, which we label average intolerance, is the  18
combination of variables 2 and 3 and is equal to 1 if either variable 2 or 3 is equal to one 
or if both are. 
 
Measures of attitude toward government  
   
The second group of variables contains measures of people’s attitude toward 
government institutions. Variables 5, 6, and 7 are based on the following: “I am going to 
name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence 
you have in it: a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much 
confidence, or none at all?” The answers are coded 1 to 4, by increasing degree of 
confidence. The organizations we considered are the government, the police, and the 
armed forces.  
 
Measures of attitude toward women 
  The third group of variables contains measures of people’s attitude toward 
women. Since we are ultimately interested in the effects on labor participation, we 
focused on questions that might influence women’s propensity to work. Hence, variable 8 
is the answer to this question: “When jobs are scarce, should men have more right to a 
job than women?” Answers are coded 1 to 4; we recoded them so that a higher number 
represents a higher degree of agreement. Variable 9 comes from the answer to the 
question: “Do you think that women should have children in order to be fulfilled, or is 
this not necessary?” The answer needs children is coded as one, the answer not 
necessary is coded as zero. Variables 10 to 12 come from the answer to the question “For 
each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with  19
each. Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly?” The statements are: 
“Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay” (variable 10); “Both the 
husband and wife should contribute to household income” (variable 11); “A university 
education is more important for a boy than for a girl” (variable 12). We recoded them so 
that a higher number represents a higher degree of agreement. 
 
Measures of attitude toward legal norms 
 
The fourth group of variables contains measures of people’s attitude toward legal 
norms. Variable 13 is based on a question similar to variables 5 to 7, except that the 
organization mentioned is the legal system.   Answers are coded 1 to 4; we recoded them 
so that a higher number represents a higher degree of confidence. Variables 14 to 18 are 
based on the following question: “ Please tell me for each of the following statements 
whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, 
using this card.” Answers are in the range 1-10, with 1 = never justifiable and 10= 
always justifiable. 
The questions we are interested in are:  “Claiming government benefits to which 
you are not entitled” (var. 14); “Avoiding a fare on public transport” (var. 
15);“Cheating on taxes if you have a chance” (var. 16); “Buying something you knew 
was stolen” (var. 17); “Accepting a bribe in the course of their duties” (var. 18).  
 
Measures of attitude toward the market 
  
The fifth group contains measures of people’s attitude toward the market 
(variables 19-21). They are based on the following question: “Now I'd like you to tell me  20
your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means 
you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with 
the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose 
any number in between.” The statement on the left is normally the opposite of the 
statement on the right. The statements considered are (reporting only the statements on 
the right): “We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort” (var. 
19);  “Private ownership of business and industry should be increased” (var. 20); 
“Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas” (var.21).  
 
Measures of attitude toward the thriftiness and fairness of the market   
 
As measure of attitude toward thriftiness, we use the answer to the question: Here 
is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do 
you consider to be especially important? We code a 1 if the respondent lists as important 
“Thrift, saving money and things”.
4  
Variables from 23 to 25 are questions framed as are variables 19 to 21, except that 
the statements are: “People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves” 
(var. 23);“In the long run hard work usually brings a better life” (var. 24); “Wealth can 
grow so there is enough for everybody” (var.25).  
Finally, variable 26 is based on the question: “Why, in your opinion, are there 
people in this country who live in need? Here are two opinions: Which comes closest to 
you view? We code as 1 the answer “They are poor because of laziness and lack of will 
power” and zero the answer “They are poor because society treats them unfairly.”  
 
                                                 
4 The interviewed person is presented with a list of eleven alternatives, ranging from imagination to 
obedience, and can mention at most five as important.   21
Other control variables 
To isolate the effect of religion from other confounding effects, we control for 
country fixed effects and several individual characteristics. This strategy might 
underestimate the impact of religion, since religion positively affects health (Ellison, 
1991, Levin, 1994 and Levin and Vanderpool, 1987), and income (Chiswick, 1983). 
Nevertheless, we think it is important to establish whether religion has an additional 
direct effect.   
Table 1, Panel E, reports the demographic characteristics of the respondents. 
“Health” is coded based on the question: “All in all, how would you describe your state of 
health these days?” (1=Very poor; 2=Poor, 3=Fair, 4=Good, 5=Very good). “Male” is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is male, otherwise it is zero. “Age” is 
expressed in years. “Education” is the age in years at which the respondent completed his 
or her highest education (excluding apprenticeships). “Social class” is coded based on the 
response to the question:  “People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the 
working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself 
as belonging to the: 1=Lower class, 2=Working class, 3=Lower middle class, 4=Upper 
middle class, 5=Upper class.”  
“Income” is coded based on the response to the question: “Here is a scale of 
incomes. We would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, 
salaries, pensions, and other income that comes in. Just give the letter of the group your 
household falls into, before taxes and other deductions” (income categories are coded by 
decile for each society, 1=lowest decile, 10=highest decile).  
 
  22
III. The Impact of Religion  
  
 In Table 2 we present our results on the overall effects of religion. Each attitude 
is regressed on our four indicators of religiosity - atheists, people brought up religiously, 
currently religious, and actively religious - some control variables, country specific 
effects, and calendar year dummies.  The size of the reference sample differs across 
regressions; valid observations vary according to specific questions on individual 
attitudes, and range from 52,252 to 95,739.    
Control variables  
Before we comment on the results on the impact of religion, it is useful to discuss 
the effect of our control variables.  The results, which are of independent interest, are 
very reasonable and provide credibility to the measures of attitude we are going to use.  
First, health has a strong positive impact on all attitudes. Healthier people trust 
other people more, are more tolerant, trust the government and the police more, have a 
more progressive attitude toward women, are less likely to break legal norms, and believe 
more in markets. The only exception is that healthier people view thrift as less of a value 
(perhaps because, being healthy, they appreciate the benefits of precautionary saving 
less). All of these results are statistically significant. From a quantitative point of view, 
the strongest impact is on trust toward others; an improvement in the health status from 
“fair” to “very good” increases the average level by 27 percent. In intolerance toward 
immigrants, the same increase in health reduces the level of intolerance by 12 percent.   
Gender also plays a role in some, but not all, attitudes. Males tend to be more 
intolerant, to trust the government and the armed forces more (but not the police), to be  23
more likely to break legal norms, and to be more in favor of markets. Not surprisingly, 
their attitude toward women is less progressive than that of women themselves.   
Older people tend to trust others more, perhaps reflecting a cohort effect, but they 
are also more intolerant and less progressive toward women. They trust government 
institutions more, and they are less likely to break the law. Their attitude toward markets, 
however, is more mixed. Older people lean more toward equality in the equality versus 
incentives trade off and are less enthusiastic about an increase in private ownership. On 
the other hand, they believe more in individual (instead of government) responsibility, 
they believe more that competition is good, and that hard work improves life. They also 
have more confidence that wealth can grow so that there is enough for everyone.    
Education increases trust toward others, reduces intolerance, and improves 
attitude toward women, but it does decrease the level of trust in government institutions. 
Education tends to reduce the willingness to break legal norms, but the effect is not 
always there. For example, more educated individuals seem to be more willing to cheat 
on taxes (although this effect is not statistically significant) and more willing to avoid 
paying the fare on public transport. Education also seems to improve attitude toward the 
market, but to decrease thriftiness and the conviction that the market outcome is fair.  
More educated people are more willing to believe that success is a matter of luck and 
connections rather than hard work and less willing to believe that the poor are such 
because they are lazy.    
A higher (self-perceived) social status is associated with more trust toward others, 
but also more intolerance. Its impact on trust toward government institutions is mixed and 
tends not to be significant.  A higher (self-perceived) social status also is associated with  24
a lower willingness to break legal norms and with a higher acceptance of market 
principles.  
Finally, higher income has similar effects to higher social status but with a few 
interesting exceptions. Higher income people have more progressive attitudes toward 
women, although they perceive that the wife has less of a duty to contribute to household 
income. Higher income people are more (rather than less) tolerant, but trust government 
institutions less. In general they are less willing to break legal norms, but there are two 
important exceptions: they are more willing to cheat on taxes and more willing to justify 
a bribe.  
In summary, while these controls are difficult to interpret because they may be 
reflecting several effects, their sign conforms to some intuitive priors, and this reassures 
us that the attitudes we are focusing on are correctly picking up what they are meant to 
measure.    
The average impact of religiosity  
Table 2 also contains our estimates for the impact of different levels of religiosity. 
The excluded group is made up of non-religious people, who are not openly atheist.  The 
effects should be read cumulatively. Hence, the trust of somebody who has been raised 
religiously and attends service at least once a week (and thus also at least once a month) 
can be obtained by adding the coefficients for our three indicators of religiosity. For this 
reason, we also report the cumulative effects at the bottom of the table.  
We find that on average religion is good for the development of stronger 
institutions. Religious people trust others more, trust the government more, are less  25
willing to break the law, and believe more in the fairness of the market, but they are more 
intolerant and they have less progressive attitudes toward women.  
In general, convinced atheists behave in the opposite way from religious people: 
they are more tolerant, less trusting of the government and the police, have more 
progressive attitudes toward women, trust the legal system less, are more willing to break 
the law, and have worse attitudes toward the market and its perceived fairness. The only 
exception is that atheists tend to trust other people more. These effects are not simply 
attributable to the attitudes of Communists in the former socialist countries. Excluding 
former socialist countries from the sample yields similar results (not reported).    
    Interestingly, the aspect of religion that seems to matter is different for the 
various attitudes. “Trust toward others” is affected mostly by religious participation, not 
by being brought up religiously. This could be because this effect is entirely spurious 
(good people trust others more and they attend church) or that the dominant aspect is 
socialization at the service, rather than religious upbringing. By contrast, intolerance is 
mostly (but not uniquely) an outcome of being raised religiously. Active churchgoers are 
not more intolerant toward immigrants than the rest of the population (but not less either). 
Finally, both a religious upbringing and active religious participation increase trust 
toward government institutions.   Similarly, the more conservative attitude of religious 
people toward women is not associated with religious upbringing: the more a person 
participates in religious services, the more his attitude toward women is conservative.  
Not surprisingly, religious upbringing and affiliation are associated with a 
reduced willingness to break any sort of legal rule. It is important to stress that this result 
is also present for religious upbringing alone, which is a sign that this is not just the result  26
of a spurious correlation between unobserved individual characteristics, religiosity, and 
attitude toward legal norms.  
The correlation between religiosity and attitudes toward the market is more 
complex. People raised religiously are less willing to trade off equality for incentives and 
are less in favor of private property. The correlation changes sign, however, when it 
comes to people attending religious services on a more regular basis: they are more 
willing to trade off equality for incentives and in particular, they favor more private 
ownership.  
By contrast, religiosity is associated with a higher emphasis on thrift, a greater 
sense of individual responsibility, and a stronger belief that the market outcome is fair. 
Interestingly, religious people are more likely to believe that people are in need because 
they are lazy and lack willpower rather than because society treats them unfairly. Overall, 
religious people tend to be more supportive of markets.    
The effect of religious upbringing is particularly interesting in light of the 
identification problem that plagues all the studies on the effects of religion.  Any “effect” 
of religion might be spurious because of some underlying characteristics that shape both 
religious behavior and the attitudes we focus on. This is the case for example, when we 
analyze the relationship between attendance to service and attitudes toward women. 
Being raised religiously, however, is not a choice and cannot be attributed to individual 
characteristics. It is still possible, though, that religious upbringing might be correlated 
with some latent characteristics of the parents, which affect children’s attitudes directly 
and not through religious education.   27
Therefore, even when we use religious upbringing, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that a latent variable might drive both religiosity and people’s attitudes. For 
each individual attitude, it is easy to imagine such a variable. For example, individual (or 
parents) sociability can easily explain both religious attendance (upbringing) and level of 
trust toward other people. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine the same latent variable 
explaining all the dependent variables. If more social people are more trusting, how do 
we explain that they are also more intolerant? One would need several latent variables, all 
positively correlated, to explain all of our facts. At this point, Occam’s razor should lead 
us to accept a causal interpretation of our results.     
Yet, even if the observed correlations were driven entirely by unobserved 
individual characteristics, we still think it is interesting to show that the characteristics 
that make somebody attend religious services on a regular basis also make her more 
intolerant toward immigrants and people of other races. Even if religious people are more 
intolerant because of personal characteristics, it is hard to imagine that a community that 
attracts the intolerant would not breed further intolerance.   
Does the impact differ if a religion is dominant? 
 
Before probing into the differences between religions, we want to distinguish the 
effect of religiosity from the effect of adhering to a country’s dominant religion. A 
dominant religion often becomes enmeshed with the national culture and transmitted 
from generation to generation, not necessarily because of some deep convictions but by 
force of habit. Thus, being raised religiously and attending the services of the country’s 
dominant religion might mean very different things from being raised religiously and 
attending the services of a minority religion.   28
For this reason, we separately control for the effect of being raised in and being 
affiliated with the dominant religion (defined as the religion with the highest number of 
affilates).
5  The results are reported in Table 3.  
Overall, the impact of religiosity seems to be smaller when this is the dominant 
religion, but there are important differences. For example, we noted earlier that being 
raised religiously had a small effect on trust toward others. It turns out that this weak 
result is the combination of two strong but opposite effects. Somebody raised religiously 
tends to trust others more, if the religion is not the dominant one. Religious upbringing in 
the dominant religion is associated with a reduced trust toward others. By contrast, most 
of the correlation between religion and intolerance is attributable to dominant religions. 
Similarly, most of the effect of religious upbringing on the attitude toward the police and 
the armed forces is attributable to being raised in the dominant religion. The effect is 
negative when somebody is raised in another religion.  
The anti-women bias associated with religious education is entirely associated 
with the dominant religion. By contrast, regular churchgoers are relatively less 
conservative toward women if they belong to the dominant religion. Similarly, regular 
attendance at religious services has a less negative impact on the willingness to break 
legal norms when a person attends the services of the dominant religion. We interpret 
these results as suggesting that regular attendance at religious services is less an indicator 
of true religious beliefs when the religion is the dominant one.  
  When it comes to attitudes toward the market, the differential impact of religiosity 
in the dominant religion is mixed. The dominant religion tends to increase the effect of 
being raised religiously on the attitude toward the market and the fairness of its 
                                                 
5 For this definition we use the CIA Factbook.  29
outcomes, but reduces the impact of service attendance, again consistent with this being 
less a sign of strong religious beliefs.   
 
 
IV. The Impact of Different Religions  
 
 Thus far we have only provided evidence that religiosity matters in general. Most 
of the debate in the literature, however, is not about the effects of religion per se, but the 
effects of different religions. We deal with this in Table 4.  
For those people who claim to belong to a specific religious denomination, Table 
4 differentiates the effect of being raised religiously, attending religious services at least 
once a year, and attending services at least once a month, for the six major religious 
denominations: Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists. 
Unfortunately, the questionnaires do not treat Eastern Orthodox consistently (in two of 
the three surveys they are mixed with “others religious denominations”), so we do not 
have a separate category for them. For reasons of space we select a subset of variables for 
each of the four types of attitudes we study.
6 
Religious upbringing has a negative and statistically significant impact on trust 
for Catholics, Muslims, and Hindus. In all other religions the effect is null. By contrast, in 
all religions a higher attendance at religious services is associated with a higher level of 
trust toward others. The only exception is Hinduism. To compare the overall effect of 
religion, the last two columns of Table 4 report the total. The next to last column shows 
                                                 
6 These are: general trust and intolerance toward others (as representative of attitudes toward cooperation); 
trust the government (for attitudes toward the government and other institutions); trust the legal system, 
cheating on taxes and accepting a bribe (for attitudes toward legal rules); men deserve scarce jobs and 
university education, respectively, more than women (as representative of opinions toward women); 
income inequality as providing incentives, opinions about increasing private ownership, and judgement 
about competition (as representative of attitudes toward  the market) and teaching thriftiness to children and  30
the total impact on trust of a person who attends a religious service at least once a week. 
Since the incidence of churchgoers differs across religious denominations, these figures 
do not represent a true average impact of a specific religious denomination. Hence, in the 
last column of table 4 we weigh the impact of the different level of religiosity by the 
denomination-specific level of religiosity.  Most of the time the two numbers tell the 
same story, but we point out important exceptions.  
Overall, Christian religions foster trust, but more so for Protestants. Because the 
sign is opposite when we focus on religious upbringing, we should be suspicious that the 
effect is spurious. On the other hand, the fact that it is not present for every religion is 
evidence against a purely spurious effect. Why would more trusting people attend 
religious services more often if they are Catholics or Protestants, but not if they are Jews 
or Muslims? At the very least, we should admit that there is something specific to these 
religions (and not to the others) that attracts more trusting people.  The “impact” of being 
Protestant is almost twice as large as that of being Catholic, and this difference is 
statistically significant. In turn, Catholicism breeds trust more than any other non-
Christian religion.  The only caveat for Jews is that the sample does not include Israel, so 
all the Jews are minorities living in countries dominated by people of different religious 
denominations. Thus, this difference might reflect the discrimination to which they are 
subject.  
The relation between religion and intolerance seems to be present in all religious 
denominations, both for religious upbringing and for attendance at religious services. 
Only Buddhists are more tolerant. The point estimates for Protestants and Catholics are 
                                                                                                                                                 
believing the poor are so because are lazy  (as representative of opinions about thriftiness and the fairness 
of markets).  31
very similar, while those of Muslims are much higher, and those of Hindus even higher. 
Actively religious Hindus are 29 percent more intolerant than non-religious people, 
Muslims 19 percent, actively religious Protestant and Catholics 7 percent more.  
Religious upbringing increases trust in the government for Muslims and to a 
lesser extent, for Hindus. Religious participation increases trust in the government for all 
religious denominations except Buddhists. The effect is stronger for Hindus and 
Muslims, weaker for Catholics and Protestants.  
As Panels D and E show, all religious denominations are associated with a more 
conservative attitude toward women. However, that effect is twice as strong for Muslims 
than for any other religion.  
Similarly, all religions result in increased trust in the legal system and reduced 
willingness to break legal rules; however, the effect differs significantly across religious 
denominations. Judaism has the strongest negative impact on willingness to cheat on 
taxes, Protestantism second, Catholicism and Hinduism third, and Islam fourth. The 
rankings are different when it comes to accepting a bribe. The strongest negative impact 
comes from Buddhism, with Protestants and Muslims next, and Catholics last.  
Religions differ most in their position on the trade off between equality and 
incentives. Protestants and Hindus are more willing to trade off equality for incentives, 
while Jews and Muslims are less so. For the other religions, the effect is insignificant.  
Religious denominations also differ in their attitudes toward private ownership. 
Protestants, Catholics, and Hindus want more private ownership, while Muslims want 
significantly less private ownership. Interestingly, Catholics support private ownership 
twice as much as Protestants (and the difference is statistically significant at the 10  32
percent level). Catholics also are more in favor of competition than any other religious 
group (including Protestants), while religious Muslims and Hindus are strongly against 
competition.   
 Only Catholics believe strongly that thrift is a value to be taught to children. 
Among Protestants, only those who attend religious services just once a year share this 
conviction.  Regular churchgoers are less likely to include thrift as a value to be taught to 
children. This is somewhat at odds with Weber’s claim that the Protestant religion has 
favored the development of capitalism through its emphasis on thrift.    
  Finally, religious people of all denominations (except Buddhists) are more 
inclined to believe that people in need are lazy and lack will power. The effect is 
somewhat stronger for Protestants than for Catholics.  
 
Does the impact differ if a religion is a minority? 
 
 
Table 5 reports the results obtained by dividing the sample on the basis of the 
dominant religion (as reported in the CIA Factbook). For space considerations, we only 
report the results with the three main religions: Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam.   
In Catholic-dominated countries, religions have a less positive impact on trust 
toward others for all religious denominations, including Catholics themselves. Not 
surprisingly, religions tend to increase intolerance only when they are dominant. Thus, 
Catholics are more intolerant in Catholic countries, but not in Protestant countries; 
Protestants are more intolerant in Protestant countries, but not in Catholic ones. An 
interesting result comes from panel C: religious Jews trust the government less in a 
Catholic-dominated country, while they trust it significantly more in Protestant- 33
dominated countries. This result can be explained easily in light of the strong anti-
Semitism historically present in the Catholic Church’s tradition, as reflected in the way 
that Jews were treated in the Papal state.
7  
The relationship between religiosity and other attitudes does not seem to be 
affected greatly by what the dominant religion is.  
 
Has the Impact of Catholicism Changed? 
 
The aggregate-level evidence suggests the Catholic religion has a negative effect 
on trust (La Porta et al, 1997, Inglehart, 1999) and institutions (La Porta et al., 1999). In 
the micro data we find some evidence for the first, but very little evidence for the second. 
One possibility is that these characteristics are not specific to Catholicism, but rather 
come from other dimensions of the culture in the regions where Catholicism is prevalent 
(mainly Southern European countries and their former colonies). Alternatively, these 
qualities may have been specific to Catholicism, but they have changed since the reforms 
introduced by the Second Vatican Council. In this latter case, they would simply survive 
as a cultural aspect of countries imbued with Catholic culture, but not in the Catholic 
people. 
  To try to separate these two effects we re-run the regressions described in Table 4, 
splitting the sample based on the age of the respondent. The Second Vatican Council, 
which took place in 1962, substantially changed Catholic doctrine and teaching. Not only 
was the use of Latin in the Mass abolished, but also there was an opening up of dialogue 
with the other religious denominations. As a result, Catholics after 1960 received a very 
different education from their older peers. If these changes indeed affected the influence 
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of Catholicism, we should see a difference in the effect of Catholicism on the older 
versus the younger generation. To control for generic cohort differences in Table 6, we 
insert a dummy for people born after 1960 into the basic regression and then interact this 
dummy with the different levels of religiosity of Catholics.  
We find that Catholics raised after Vatican II are more trusting of other people 
and less intolerant. Their religious upbringing and practice also have less of a negative 
effect on women’s rights.  Interestingly, Vatican II does not seem to have caused a 
relaxation in moral values. While the younger cohort on average is more likely to break 
legal norms, Catholics raised after Vatican II are less likely to break legal norms than 
older Catholics (panel C). By contrast, Catholics raised after Vatican II are less pro-
market (panel C).  They believe less in private property and competition. They value 
thrift more, but they are more willing to believe that people are poor because of some 
injustice in society.   These results overall provide some preliminary evidence in favor 
of the hypothesis that the negative impact of Catholicism found in the previous literature 
may be explained by some cultural characteristics that survive in countries imbued with 
Catholic culture, but do not exist anymore in Catholic people. More research is needed to 
investigate this hypothesis further. In the meantime, we can conclude that Catholicism 
today is not a significant obstacle to economic development.   
 
V. Conclusions  
 
In our analysis of the effect of religion on people’s attitudes toward cooperation, 
government, women, legal rules, the market economy, and thriftiness we have found a 
remarkable number of regularities. We found on average that religion is good for the 
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development of attitudes that are conducive to economic growth. But this statement needs 
to be qualified.  
First, religious people are more intolerant and have more conservative views of the 
role of women in society. Second, these correlations differ depending on whether a 
specific religious denomination dominates in a country. Third, these correlations differ 
across religious denominations.  
Since Weber the previous literature on the effects of religions on growth has tried to 
“rank” religions or at least highlight characteristics in some religious denominations that 
would make them more conducive for economic growth than others. If we try to do the 
same with our results, the ranking would not be consistent across attitudes. On average, 
Christian religions are more positively associated with attitudes that are conducive to 
economic growth, while Islam is negatively associated. The ranking between the two 
main Christian denominations is less clear. Protestants trust others and the legal system 
more than Catholics and they are less willing to cheat on taxes and accept a bribe with 
respect to Catholics. By contrast, Catholics support private ownership twice as much as 
Protestants and are more in favor of competition than any other religious group 
(including Protestants). The only case in which Protestants seem more pro-market than 
Catholics is on incentives. When asked whether they are willing to accept more income 
inequality to provide incentives Protestants and Hindus are the only religious groups that 
favor incentives. This result is consistent with Weber’s view.  
 From these results, however, we cannot conclude which religion is better for growth. 
In order to answer this question two further steps are necessary. First, we need to 
investigate the relative importance of the attitudes studied for economic growth. Second,  36
we need to make a stronger case that the statistical relations observed are causal. Further 
research is needed.  37
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Table 1: Sample Statistics 
 
This table reports sample statistics of the responses from WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-
1984, 1990-93 and 1995-97 (ICPSR 2790). Respondents were from 66 independent countries in 
at least one wave. These countries include almost 80 percent of the world's population. The 
coverage of countries varies across surveys. The 1981-83 survey covered 22 independent 
countries plus Northern Ireland; the 1990-93 survey covered 42 independent countries plus 
Northern Ireland, and Greater Moscow; the 1995-97 survey covered 54 independent countries.  
 
Panel A reports summary statistics of religious beliefs by country. The first column reports the 
percentage of respondents that answered yes to the question “Were you brought up religiously at 
home?” The second and the third column reports the answer to the following question “Apart 
from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these 
days?”. The fourth column is the percentage of people who answer no to the question “Do you 
believe in God?” 
 
Panel B reports distribution of population by religious denomination and country. 
Religious denomination is coded based on the answers to the following question: “Do 
you belong to a religious denomination?  IF YES: Which one?” 
 
Panel C reports summary statistics of the intensity of religious beliefs by religious 
denomination.   
 
Panel D reports summary statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis. Variable 1 is 
based on the following question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? The variable is equal to 1 if 
participants report that most people can be trusted and zero otherwise. Variables 2 and 3 are 
based on the following question: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort 
out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?” (Variable 2: People of a different race; 
Variable 3: The immigrants). Variable 4 is the combination of variables 2 and 3 and is equal to 1 
if either variable 2 or 3 or both is equal to one. Variables 5, 6 and 7 are based on the general 
question: I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how 
much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not 
very much confidence or none at all? Answers are coded 1-4, we recoded them so that a higher 
number represents a higher degree of confidence. Organizations we considered are the 
government, the police and the armed forces. Variables 8 comes from the answers to the question 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: When jobs are scarce, men should have 
more right to a job than women? Answers are coded 1-4, we recoded them so that a higher 
number represents a higher degree of agreement. Variables 9 comes from the answers to the 
question: Do you think that women should have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not 
necessary? The answer needs children is coded as one, the answer not necessary is coded as a 
zero. Variables 10-12 come from the answer to the question For each of the following statements 
I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each.  Do you agree strongly, agree, 
disagree, or disagree strongly? The statements are: Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as 
working for pay (variable 10), Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income 
(variable 11), A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl (variable 12). We 
recoded them so that a higher number represents a higher degree of agreement. Variable 13 is 
based on a question similar to variables 5 to 7, except that the organization mentioned is the legal 
system.   Answers are coded 1-4, we recoded them so that a higher number represents a higher 
degree of confidence. Variables 14 to 18 are based on the following question: “ Please tell me for  41
each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or 
something in between, using this card.” Answers are in the range 1-10, with 1 = never justifiable 
and 10= always be justifiable. “Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled” (var. 
14). “Avoiding a fare on public transport” (var. 15). “Cheating on taxes if you have a chance” 
(var. 16). “Buying something you knew was stolen” (var. 17). “Accepting a bribe in the course of 
their duties” (var. 18). Variables 19-21 and 23 to 26 are based on the following question: Now I'd 
like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 
means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with 
the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any 
number in between. The statement on the left is normally the opposite of the statement on the 
right. Statements considered are (we report only statement on the right): We need larger income 
differences as incentives for individual effort” (var. 19); “Private ownership of business and 
industry should be increased“ (var. 20); “Competition is good. It stimulates to work hard and 
develop new ideas” (var.21); People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves 
(var. 23);“In the long run hard work usually brings a better life” (var. 24); “Wealth can grow so 
there is enough for everybody” (var.25). Variable 22 is based on the answer to the question Here 
is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you 
consider to be especially important? We code as 1 if the respondent list as important “Thrift, 
saving money and things”. Variable 26 is based on the question: Why, in your opinion, are there 
people in this country who live in need? Here are two opinions: Which comes closest to you 
view? We code as one the answer “They are poor because of laziness and lack of will power” and 
zero the answer “They are poor because society treats them unfairly”.  
  
Panel E reports the demographic characteristics of the respondents. “Health” is coded based on 
the question: “All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? (1=Very poor; 
2=Poor, 3=Fair, 4=Good, 5=Very good)”. “Male” is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
respondent is male, otherwise equal to zero. “Age” is expressed in years. “Education” is the age 
in years at which the respondent completed his or her highest education (excluding 
apprenticeships). “Social class” is coded based on the response to the question:  “People 
sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper 
or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the: 1=Lower class, 2=Working 
class, 3=Lower middle class, 4=Upper middle class, 5=Upper class”. “Income” is coded based on 
the response to the question: “Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group 
your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just 
give the letter of the group your household falls into, before taxes and other deductions” (income 
categories are coded by decile for each society, 1=lowest decile, 10=highest decile).  42
Panel A: Attitudes towards religion by country (percentages) 
Country Raised  religiously 
at home 
Goes to church  
at least once a 
year 
Goes to church  
at least once a 
week 





France 32.38  37.1  10.4  33.02  2202 
Britain 23.84  30.38  9.95  12.92  3808 
West Ger  43.3  56.34  16.98  19.35  4423 
Italy 56  76.86  35.44  10.07  3366 
Netherlands 32.57 53.22  22.79  29.54  2238 
Denmark 19.8  42.68  2.67  31.65  2212 
Belgium 60.12  51.21  27.53  22.28  3937 
Spain 75.33  57.9  29.64  11.59  13370 
Ireland 42.44  93.73  81.46  2.75  2217 
N. Ireland  41.4  81.33  50.65  3.25  616 
U.S.A. 48.28  74.57  43.27  3.21  5706 
Japan 14.26  71.06  3.06  25.45  3269 
Mexico 50.57  82.06  48.22  4.47  4878 
S. Africa  68.52  48.78  31.94  1.6  7267 
Hungary 27.97  43.32  12.38  33.17  2463 
Australia 64.06  46.34  16.5  18.65  2048 
Norway 28.27  47.98  5.07  28.74  3612 
Sweden 21.13  37.77  4.55  39.44  3010 
Iceland 32.29  53.22  2.33  16.94  1629 
Argentina 54.8  59.88  22.59  7.58  3086 
Finland 29.44  53.41  3.65  10.82  2578 
Poland 96.84  92.35  59.92  1.48  2091 
Switzerland 68.26 58.23 18.91  6.74  2612 
Puerto Rico  86.77  81.19  51.55  0.69  1164 
Brazil 76.08  68.41  34.63  1.26  2931 
Chile 79.92  63.96  26.64  3.76  2500 
Belarus 25.65  46.77  4.83  29.03  3107 
India 91.39  89.27  49.1  5.99  4540 
East Ger  43.71  34.88  9.68  62.22  2345 
Slovenia 72.82  63.61  22.43  33.3  2042 
Bulgaria 39.55  44.73  6.32  41.12  2106 
Romania 76.97  85.4  18.59  5.98  1103 
Portugal 83.8  59.92  39.07  10.04  1185 
Austria 82.05  67.67  25.41  11.92  1460 
Turkey 60.64  54.68  32.41  1.23  2937 
Lithuania 68.09  38.43  7.77  5.97  2009 
Latvia 27.58  44.56  3.38  19.26  2103 
Estonia 16.07  25.33  1.82  21.49  2029 
Ukraine 30.74  54.46  9.82  19.85  2811 
Russia 15.96  27.13  1.67  30.3  6775 
Peru 78.2  78.78  41.78  1.98  1211 
Venezuela 84.5  77.92  30.92  0.92  1200 
Uruguay 67.3  34.8  13.2  13.9  1000 
Moldova 63.72  75.2  10.77  8.94  984 
Georgia 44.43  73.81  9.53  6.56  2593  43
Armenia 23.8  72.75  7.3  13.2  2000 
Azerbaijan 59.59  67.73 5.64  2.15  2002 
Dominican 
Republ 
82.73 71.94  43.41 7.19  417 
Bangladesh 93.05 90.03 63.08  1.38  1525 
Colombia 90.95  80.2  45.68  0.45  6025 
Serbia 53.98  63.05  5.78  27.34  1280 
Montenegro 37.08 52.08  7.08 30.42  240 
Macedonia 58.09  71.16 10.95  14.47  995 
Croatia 73.75  72.16  22.32  18.14  1196 
Bosnia 64.83  77.75  31  13.92  1200 
          
All countries  53.62  59.25  23.75  14.77  149653 
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Panel B: Distribution of population by religious denomination and country (percentages) 
Country Catholic  Protestant Jewish Muslim Hindu Buddhist Other  No  religious
             Affiliations  Affiliations 
France 63.18  1.68  0.32  0.45  0.05  0.68  16.09  17.55 
Britain 10.52  57.6  0.37  0.33 0.3  0.07  2.62  28.19 
West Ger  41.16  44.66  0.07  0.16 0.02  0.02  0.75  13.16 
Italy 86.89  0.12  0.03  0  0  0.06  0.77  12.13 
Netherlands 31.01  22.12  0  0.23  0.23  0.09  3.04  43.29 
Denmark 1.08  94.26  0.05  0.19  0.71  0.05  0.47  3.20 
Belgium 70.57  1.07  0.26  0.39 0  0.03  1.1  26.58 
Spain 84.7  0.53  0.03  0.06  0.01  0.04  0.6  14.03 
Ireland 94.77  2.86  0  0.05  0  0  0.5  1.82 
N. Ireland  27.08  65.12  0  0  0  0  2.82  4.98 
U.S.A. 28.57  46.87  1.77  0.29  0.2  0.38  9.41  12.52 
Japan 0.73  1.12  0.04  0 0.11  43.83  6.31  47.86 
Mexico 77.82  7.21  0.14  0.04 0.02  0.1  1.36  13.30 
S. Africa  11.59  58.78  1.46  2  1.88  0.1  14.17  10.01 
Hungary 70.86  26.41  0.36  0.31  0  0  1.44  0.62 
Australia 26.71  48.74  0.79  0.74 0.69  1.23  1.87  19.22 
Norway 0.76  92.65  0.03  0.38  0.03  0.09  2.92  3.15 
Sweden 3.21  87.6  0.14  0.17  0.03  0.03  8.81  0 
Iceland 0.44  98.07  0  0  0  0  1.5  0 
Argentina 78.17  1.49  1.69  0.1  0.1  0.13  4.25  14.06 
Finland 13.23  71.71  3.74  2.52  0  0  1.18  7.61 
Poland 94.82  1.84  0  0  0.05  0.05  1.45  1.79 
Switzerland 51.67  40.64  0.16 0.16 0.04 0.04  2.49  4.79 
Puerto Rico  56.91  7.86  0  0  8.29  0.35  7.86  18.74 
Brazil 70.32  6.73  0.03  0.07 0  0.14  10.84  11.87 
Chile 77.84  7.93  0.23  0  0.18  0.05  8.29  5.50 
Belarus 9.72  0.26  0.04  0.09 0.04  0  59.19  30.66 
India 2.1  1.28  0.04  8.47  83.72  0.66  1.61  2.10 
East Ger  11.96  18.21  0.09  0  0  0  0.43  69.31 
Slovenia 70.19  0.88  0  1.28  0  0  1.92  25.74 
Bulgaria 0.67  0.91  0.05  9.23  0.14  0  39.01  50.00 
Romania 2.27  3.45  0  0.18  0  0  88.21  5.89 
Portugal 77.13  0.34  0.08  0  0  0  1.01  21.43 
Austria 76.23  6.44  0.21  0  0  0  0.62  16.51 
Turkey 0.4  0.12  0.2  95.57  0  0  2.37  1.35 
Lithuania 83.28  1.6  0.25  0.06  0.06  0.12  6.48  8.14 
Latvia 23.75  21.76  0.4  0.33  0  0.07  23.95  29.74 
Estonia 0.61  15.38  0  0.35  0  0.44  19.67  63.55 
Ukraine 6.17  0.33  0.11  0.22 0.07  0.07  59.52  33.49 
Russia 5.11  1.07  0.07  1.62  0.01  0.79  25.9  65.42 
Peru 82.84  6.22  0  0.66 1.66  0.17  1.41  7.05 
Venezuela 84.54  6.4  0  0  0.09  0.09  1.2  7.69 
Uruguay 43.06  1.22  0.1  0  0  0.1  8.78  46.73 
Moldova 0.41  0.2  0  0.1  0  0  84.13  15.16 
Georgia 1.48  0.08  1.32  3.96  0  0.19  86.83  6.14 
Armenia 4.26  0.66  0.33  0  0  0  86.56  8.20  45
Azerbaijan 0.1  0.25  0.15  91.55  0  0  1.91  6.03 
Dominican 
Republic 
59.47 1.7  0  0 1.7  0  13.35  23.79 
Bangladesh 0.99  0  0  85.86  12.82  0.2  0.13 0 
Colombia 84.39  5.34  0.03  0  0  0  0  10.24 
Serbia 6.33  0.87  0  5.78  0  0  68.88  18.13 
Montenegro 8.47  0  0  21.61  0  0  64.41  5.51 
Macedonia 0.71  0.1  0.31  24.31  0  0  46.69  27.87 
Croatia 84.31  0.34  0.42  1.19 0.08  0  1.19  12.47 
Bosnia 14.49  2.35  0.42  27.3  0  0  26.13  29.31 
                
Total 40.87  19.7  0.36  5.29  3.07  1.01  11.61  17.19 
 
 
Panel C. Religiosity by religious denomination (percentages) 
Country Raised  religiously 
at home 
Goes to church  
at least once a 
year 
Goes to church  
at least once a 
week 
Catholic  70.3 75.3  38.8 
Protestant  47.4 59.5  25.0 
Jew  44.6 57.0  16.4 
Muslim  67.9 67.8  34.5 
Hindu  83.8 84.7  44.4 
Buddhist  22.2 75.8  8.3 




Panel D. Summary statistics of economic and social attitudes 
Variable    Mean Median  SD  Interq. 
Range 
Min Max
Attitudes towards others          
1. Trust people (0,1)  0.29 0  0.45 1  0  1 
2. Intolerant towards other races (0,1)   0.12 0  0.33 0  0  1 
3. Intolerant towards the immigrants (0,1)  0.14 0  0.35 0  0  1 
4. Average intolerance  0.39 0.4  0.27 0.4  0 1 
Attitudes towards the government    
5.Trust the government  2.3 2  0.93 1  1  4 
6. Trust the police   2.53 3  0.91 1  1  4 
7. Trust the armed forces   2.61 3  0.94 1  1  4 
Attitudes towards women          
8. When jobs are scarce, men should have more 
right to a job than women  1.85 1  0.91 2  1  3 
9. Do you think that women should have 
children in order to be fulfilled  0.53 1 0.5  1  0  1 
10. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as 
working for pay  2.81 3  0.87 1  1  4 
11. Both the husband and wife should contribute 
to household income  1.76 2  0.71 1  1  4 
12. A university education is more important for 
a boy than for a girl  2.03 2  0.89 1  1  4 
Attitudes toward legal rules           
13. Trust the legal system   2.52 3  0.88 1  1  4 
14. It is justified to claim government benefits 
you are not entitled to?  2.27 1  2.25 2  1  10 
15. It is justified to avoid a fare on public 
transport?  2.53 1  2.42 2  1  10 
16. It is justified to cheat on taxes?  2.6 1  2.47 3  1  10 
17. It is justified to buy a stolen object?  1.76 1  1.73 0  1  10 
18. It is justified to accept a bribe?  1.73 1 1.7  0  1  10 
Attitudes toward the market          
19. Inequality of income gives incentives to 
individuals versus income should be made more 
equal  5.91 6  2.97 4  1  10 
20. Private ownership should be increased 
versus government ownership should be 
increased  6.17 6  2.82 4  1  10 
21. Competition is good versus competition is 
harmful  7.45 8  2.51 4  1  10 
Attitudes toward thriftiness          
22. Do you thinks to be especially important 
that children be encouraged to learn at home 
“thrift, saving money and things”  0.32 0  0.47 1  0  1 
Attitudes toward market’s fairness          
23. Individual responsibility versus government 
assistance  5.18 5  3.06 6  1  10  47
Variable    Mean Median  SD  Interq. 
Range 
Min Max
24. Hard work improves life versus success is 
more a matter of luck and connections.  6.54 7  2.91 5  1  10 
25. Wealth can grow so there's enough for 
everyone versus one can get rich only at 
expense of others   6.48 7  2.77 4  1  10 
26. In your opinion who lives in need is poor 
because of laziness and lack of will power  0.1 0  0.3 0  0  1 
 
Panel E: Demographic characteristics 
 Mean  Median  Standard  Deviation Minimum Maximum  Observations
Health  2.7  3  0.94 0  4  144704 
Male  0.46  0  0.5 0  1  149653 
Age  43.13  39  18.81 17  95  137520 
Education  18.06  18  4.52 6  35  127855 
Social class  2.52  2  1.49 0  5  145518 
Income  4.75  4  2.59 0  10  122058 
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Table 2. Religion and social and economic attitudes 
All the variables are defined in the legend of table 1. The row “Raised religiously+ Currently religious” 
reports the sum of the coefficients for “Raised religiously”+ “Currently religious”, followed by the p-values 
for the test that the sum of the coefficients is significantly different from zero (in brackets). The row 
“Raised religiously+ Currently religious+Actively religious” reports the sum of the three coefficients, 
followed by the p-values for the test that the sum of the coefficients is significantly different from zero (in 
brackets). All the other numbers in brackets are standard errors. All the regressions include a country fixed 
effect and survey-year dummies. Panel A: Attitudes toward others and the government 
 














0.0424*** -0.0052*** -0.0096*** -0.0039*** 0.0545*** 0.0388*** 0.0290***  Health 
(0.0017)  (0.0012)  (0.0014)  (0.0009) (0.0047) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
0.0027 0.0151***  0.0146***  0.0047***  0.0276***  -0.0046 0.0532***  Male 
(0.0029)  (0.0021)  (0.0023)  (0.0016) (0.0076) (0.0055) (0.0056) 
0.0011***  0.0009***  0.0006***  0.0016*** 0.0048*** 0.0048*** 0.0069***  Age 
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
0.0057*** -0.0031*** -0.0030*** -0.0017*** -0.0072*** -0.0094*** -0.0110*** Education 
(0.0004)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
0.0129*** 0.0020*  -0.0007 -0.0011  0.0122*** 0.0068**  -0.0036  Social class 
(0.0015)  (0.0011)  (0.0012)  (0.0008) (0.0042) (0.0028) (0.0028) 
0.0084*** -0.0040*** -0.0049*** -0.0016*** -0.0087*** -0.0086*** -0.0068*** Income 
(0.0007)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0004) (0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
0.0313*** -0.0010 0.0123*** -0.0053** -0.0128  -0.0622*** -0.1358*** Atheist 
(0.0044)  (0.0032)  (0.0034)  (0.0023) (0.0117) (0.0083) (0.0085) 
0.0075*  0.0120***  0.0107***  0.0068*** 0.0556*** 0.0233***  0.0086  Raised 
religiously 
(0.0039)  (0.0028)  (0.0030)  (0.0021) (0.0096) (0.0074) (0.0076) 
0.0179***  0.0077***  0.0092***  0.0166*** 0.0939*** 0.1032*** 0.1277***  Currently 
religious 
(0.0035)  (0.0025)  (0.0028)  (0.0019) (0.0094) (0.0067) (0.0068) 
0.0314***  0.0055*  0.0020  0.0056**  0.0448*** 0.0964*** 0.0860***  Actively 
religious 
(0.0040)  (0.0029)  (0.0032)  (0.0022) (0.0110) (0.0077) (0.0078) 
Number of obs   95901  95739  91788  90340  52252  93803  94244 

























religious    
+actively 
religious 
(0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  (0.0000 ) 
 
Panel B: Attitudes toward women 
  When jobs are 
scarce, men should 
have more right to 
a job than women 
Do you think that 
women should 
have children in 
order to be 
fulfilled 
Being a 
housewife is just 









education is more 
important for a boy 
than for a girl 
Health -0.0281*** -0.0067*** 0.0120***  -0.0045 -0.0235*** 
 (0.0038)  (0.0017)  (0.0038)  (0.0042)  (0.0053) 
Male 0.2126***  0.0164***  0.1266***  0.1380***  0.1880*** 
 (0.0063)  (0.0029)  (0.0062)  (0.0069)  (0.0086) 
Age 0.0046***  0.0026***  0.0037***  -0.0004* 0.0037*** 
 (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0003) 
Education -0.0197*** -0.0062*** -0.0122*** -0.0051*** -0.0102*** 
 (0.0008)  (0.0004)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0008) 
Social class  0.0044  0.0011  0.0038  -0.0057  -0.0050 
 (0.0035)  (0.0015)  (0.0034)  (0.0043)  (0.0054) 
Income -0.0284*** -0.0045*** -0.0228*** 0.0034**  -0.0197*** 
 (0.0015)  (0.0007)  (0.0015)  (0.0017)  (0.0021) 
Atheist -0.1114*** -0.0508*** -0.0969*** -0.0131 -0.0373*** 
 (0.0095)  (0.0044)  (0.0095)  (0.0112)  (0.0140) 
0.0414*** 0.0195***  0.0488*** 0.0004  0.0165  Raised 
religiously  (0.0080) (0.0039)  (0.0079)  (0.0085)  (0.0107) 
0.0117 0.0317***  0.0526***  0.0206**  0.0196*  Currently 
religious  (0.0077) (0.0035)  (0.0076)  (0.0085)  (0.0106) 
0.0802*** 0.0302***  0.1236***  0.0592***  0.0517***  Actively 
religious  (0.0088) (0.0040)  (0.0087)  (0.0095)  (0.0119) 
Number of obs   77347  94401  73467  40788  40025 
0.141 0.257  0.098  0.083  0.124  Adj. R squared 
















***  Raised 
religiously 
+currently 
religious    
+actively 
religious 
(0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  50
 
 
 Panel C: Attitudes towards legal rules 
  Trust the legal 
system 




are not entitled 
to? 
Is it justified to 
avoid a fare on 
public 
transport? 
Is it justified 
to cheat on 
taxes? 
Is it justified 
to buy a 
stolen 
object? 
Is it justified 
to accept a 
bribe? 
Health 0.0428***  -0.0634*** -0.0596*** -0.0479*** -0.0294*** -0.0324***
 (0.0033)  (0.0087)  (0.0092)  (0.0096)  (0.0066) (0.0065) 
Male -0.0059  0.1006*** 0.1132*** 0.3027***  0.1896***  0.1518*** 
 (0.0056)  (0.0147)  (0.0155)  (0.0161)  (0.0112) (0.0110) 
Age 0.0033***  -0.0167*** -0.0229*** -0.0196*** -0.0170*** -0.0130***
 (0.0002)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Education -0.0035*** -0.0074*** 0.0074***  0.0005  -0.0062*** -0.0048***
 (0.0007)  (0.0019)  (0.0020)  (0.0020)  (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Social class  0.0005  -0.0674*** -0.0948*** -0.0508*** -0.0049 -0.0079 
 (0.0028)  (0.0074)  (0.0078)  (0.0081)  (0.0056) (0.0055) 
Income -0.0034*** -0.0105*** -0.0096*** 0.0352***  -0.0038 0.0073*** 
 (0.0013)  (0.0034)  (0.0036)  (0.0037)  (0.0026) (0.0025) 
Atheist -0.0291*** 0.1424*** 0.1997***  0.2454***  0.2042***  0.0321* 
 (0.0084)  (0.0220)  (0.0232)  (0.0241)  (0.0167)  (0.0165) 
Raised religiously  0.0470***  -0.0473** -0.1585*** -0.1343*** -0.0971*** -0.0636***
 (0.0075)  (0.0199)  (0.0210)  (0.0218)  (0.0151) (0.0149) 
Currently religious  0.0899***  0.0257  -0.0149 -0.0483**  -0.0335**  -0.0094 
 (0.0068)  (0.0179)  (0.0188)  (0.0196)  (0.0136) (0.0134) 
Actively religious  0.0740***  -0.0920*** -0.1699*** -0.2801*** -0.1568*** -0.0897***
 (0.0077)  (0.0204)  (0.0215)  (0.0224)  (0.0155) (0.0153) 
Number of obs   94259  91793  93034  92392  93161  92878 
0.092 0.090  0.120  0.094  0.070  0.067  Adj. R squared 
          
0.1369




***  Raised religiously+ 
Currently religious 







***  Raised religiously 
+currently 
religious    
+actively religious 
(0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  (0.0000)  51
 
  
Panel D: Attitudes toward the market 






good or harmful 
Health 0.0965***  0.1247***  0.1182*** 
 (0.0126)  (0.0121)  (0.0110) 
Male 0.1923***  0.4641***  0.3098*** 
 (0.0207)  (0.0199)  (0.0181) 
Age -0.0015**  -0.0054*** 0.0025*** 
 (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0006) 
Education 0.0390***  0.0114***  0.0115*** 
 (0.0026)  (0.0025)  (0.0023) 
Social class  0.2168***  0.2003***  0.1318*** 
 (0.0115)  (0.0111)  (0.0101) 
Income 0.1174***  0.0755***  0.0467*** 
 (0.0049)  (0.0047)  (0.0043) 
Atheist -0.2102*** -0.2258*** -0.0924*** 
 (0.0310)  (0.0298)  (0.0271) 
Raised religiously  -0.0843*** -0.0653*** -0.0081 
 (0.0262)  (0.0251)  (0.0229) 
Currently religious  -0.0215  0.1326*** 0.0622*** 
 (0.0254)  (0.0245)  (0.0223) 
Actively religious  0.0512*  0.1179***  -0.0054 
 (0.0297)  (0.0287)  (0.0260) 
Number of obs   74126  71881  73311 
Adj. R squared  0.100  0.130  0.064 




*  Raised religiously+ 
Currently religious  (0.0016 )  (0.0370 )  (0.0661 ) 
-0.0546 0.1852
*** 0.0487  Raised religiously 
+currently religious    
+actively religious  (0.1476 )  (0.0000 )  (0.1410 ) 
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Panel E: Attitudes toward thriftiness and market’s fairness 










Poor are lazy 
Health -0.0110***  0.1270***  0.1336*** 0.0981*** 0.0071*** 
  (0.0018)  (0.0125)  (0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0011) 
Male 0.0036  0.2517***  0.2625***  -0.0889*** 0.0177*** 
  (0.0030)  (0.0205)  (0.0208) (0.0204) (0.0018) 
Age 0.0024***  0.0003  0.0152***  0.0087***  -0.0000 
  (0.0001)  (0.0007)  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0001) 
Education -0.0063*** 0.0092***  -0.0061** 0.0168*** -0.0023*** 
  (0.0004)  (0.0025)  (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0002) 
Social class  -0.0133*** 0.1612***  0.0894*** -0.0035 0.0142*** 
  (0.0015)  (0.0114)  (0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0009) 
Income -0.0070***  0.0731***  0.0233*** 0.0324*** 0.0036*** 
  (0.0007)  (0.0049)  (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0004) 
Atheist -0.0193*** -0.0530* -0.0926*** -0.1397*** 0.0013 
  (0.0044)  (0.0312)  (0.0311) (0.0305) (0.0027) 
Raised religiously  0.0157***  -0.0266 0.1357*** -0.0039 0.0044* 
  (0.0040)  (0.0261)  (0.0262) (0.0257) (0.0024) 
Currently  religious 0.0064*  0.0897*** 0.1189***  0.1205***  0.0075*** 
  (0.0036)  (0.0253)  (0.0255) (0.0250) (0.0022) 
Actively religious  -0.0156***  0.0876***  0.1772*** 0.1927*** 0.0072*** 
  (0.0041)  (0.0291)  (0.0297) (0.0292) (0.0025) 
Number of obs   94920  77217  74349  72229  92343 
Adj. R squared  0.108  0.155  0.080  0.042  0.231 






***  Raised religiously+ 





***  Raised religiously 
+currently 
religious    
+actively religious 




Table 3. The role of the dominant religion 
 
All the panels report coefficients from different OLS regressions. The dependent variable of each regression is 
indicated at the top of the column and is defined in the legend of Table 1. All regressions include (coefficients not 
reported) the same demographic controls as in Table 2 (health, male, age, education, social class, income), an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if a person answer no to the question “Do you believe in God?”, a country fixed 
effect, and survey-year dummies. “Raised religiously” is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent 
answered positively to the question “Were you brought up religiously at home?”.  “Currently religious” is an 
indicator variable that is equal to one if the respondent attend religious services (apart from weddings, funerals 
and christenings) at least once a year. “Actively religious” is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the 
respondent attend religious services (apart from weddings, funerals and christenings) at least once a week. 
“Raised religiously in dominant religion” is an indicator variable equal to one if “Raised religiously” is equal to 
one and the respondent belongs to the religious denomination most followed in his/her country. “Currently 
religious in dominant religion” is an indicator variable equal to one if “Currently religious” is equal to one and the 
respondent belongs to the religious denomination most followed in his/her country. “Actively religious in 
dominant religion” is an indicator variable equal to one if “Actively religious” is equal to one and the respondent 
belongs to the religious denomination most followed in his/her country.  Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
 
 
Panel A: Attitudes towards others and the government 















Raised religiously  0.0167***  0.0007  0.0002  -0.0039 0.0432*** -0.0279*** -0.0439***
  (0.0057) (0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0030) (0.0144) (0.0107) (0.0110) 
Currently  religious 0.0181***  0.0051  0.0024  0.0123*** 0.0589*** 0.0711*** 0.0684*** 
  (0.0059) (0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0031) (0.0153) (0.0112) (0.0114) 
Actively religious  0.0323***  0.0072  -0.0026 -0.0052 0.0387*  0.0915*** 0.0530*** 
  (0.0082) (0.0058) (0.0063) (0.0043) (0.0217) (0.0154) (0.0157) 
-0.0156*** 0.0148*** 0.0144*** 0.0169***  0.0165  0.0787*** 0.0809***  Raised religiously 
in dominant 
religion 
(0.0060) (0.0043) (0.0047) (0.0032) (0.0162) (0.0114) (0.0116) 
0.0044 0.0022 0.0041 0.0052  0.0315*  0.0331***  0.0840***  Currently religious 
in dominant 
religion 
(0.0066) (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0035) (0.0176) (0.0125) (0.0127) 
-0.0015 -0.0017 0.0064  0.0137*** 0.0145  0.0083  0.0429**  Actively religious 
in dominant 
religion 
(0.0092) (0.0066) (0.0072) (0.0050) (0.0247) (0.0174) (0.0178) 
         
Number of obs.  89677 89530 85614 84179 47667 87680 88124 
R squared  0.095 0.073 0.070 0.272 0.132 0.171 0.197 
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Panel B: Attitudes towards women 
  When jobs are 
scarce, men 
should have more 
right to a job than 
women 
Do you think that 
women should 
have children in 
order to be 
fulfilled 
Being a housewife 
is just as fulfilling as 
working for pay 
Both the husband 




education is more 
important for a boy 
than for a girl 
Raised religiously  0.0019  0.0083  0.0296**  -0.0070  0.0231 
 (0.0118)  (0.0057)  (0.0117)  (0.0131)  (0.0163) 
Currently religious  0.0274**  0.0287***  0.0373***  0.0013  0.0502*** 
 (0.0130)  (0.0059)  (0.0129)  (0.0143)  (0.0178) 
Actively religious  0.1397***  0.0440***  0.1848***  0.1142***  0.0200 
 (0.0182)  (0.0082)  (0.0180)  (0.0199)  (0.0247) 
0.0643*** 0.0206***  0.0312**  0.0099  -0.0210  Raised religiously in 
dominant religion  (0.0130) (0.0060)  (0.0129)  (0.0144)  (0.0179) 
-0.0108 0.0042 0.0294**  0.0218 -0.0402**  Currently religious 
in dominant religion  (0.0148) (0.0066)  (0.0147)  (0.0159)  (0.0198) 
-0.0811*** -0.0198** -0.0797*** -0.0679*** 0.0399  Actively religious in 
dominant religion  (0.0205) (0.0092)  (0.0203)  (0.0223)  (0.0277) 
Number of obs.  72186 88240  68481  38851  38148 
R squared  0.138 0.249  0.100  0.084  0.122 
 
Panel C: Attitudes towards legal rules 
  Trust the legal 
system? 
Is it justified to 
claim 
government 
benefits you are 
not entitled to? 
Is it justified to 
avoid a fare on 
public transport?
Is it justified to 
cheat on taxes? 
Is it justified to 
buy a stolen 
object? 
Is it justified 
to accept a 
bribe? 
Raised religiously  0.0134  -0.0304  -0.1127*** -0.1127*** -0.0696*** -0.0745*** 
  (0.0108) (0.0283) (0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0212)  (0.0210) 
Currently  religious  0.0531*** 0.1079*** 0.0877*** 0.0877***  0.0463**  0.0702*** 
  (0.0113) (0.0295) (0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0221)  (0.0219) 
Actively religious  0.0835***  -0.1143*** -0.3117*** -0.3117*** -0.2457*** -0.1580*** 
  (0.0156) (0.0405) (0.0428) (0.0428) (0.0305)  (0.0301) 
0.0469*** -0.0231 -0.0710**  -0.0710** -0.0193  0.0316  Raised religiously 
in dominant 
religion 
(0.0115) (0.0301) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0226)  (0.0223) 
0.0367*** -0.1107*** -0.1428*** -0.1428*** -0.1140*** -0.1095***  Currently religious 
in dominant 
religion 
(0.0126) (0.0330) (0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0247)  (0.0245) 
-0.0056 0.0323  0.1921*** 0.1921*** 0.1223***  0.0849**  Actively religious 
in dominant 
religion 
(0.0177) (0.0460) (0.0486) (0.0486) (0.0346)  (0.0342) 
Number of obs.  88157 86095 87224 87224 87356  87082 
R squared  0.091 0.094 0.124 0.124 0.070  0.067 
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Panel D: Attitudes towards the market 
  Inequality of income vs. 
incentives  
Private vs. public 
ownership  
Competition is good or 
harmful 
Raised religiously  -0.0762**  -0.1099*** -0.0894*** 
  (0.0386) (0.0369) (0.0337) 
Currently religious  0.0345  0.1464***  0.1195*** 
  (0.0425) (0.0406) (0.0371) 
Actively religious  0.0595  0.1124**  -0.0474 
  (0.0598) (0.0571) (0.0523) 
0.0189 0.0693*  0.1282***  Raised religiously in dominant 
religion  (0.0428) (0.0410) (0.0374) 
-0.0665 -0.0225  -0.0787*  Currently religious in dominant 
religion  (0.0487) (0.0465) (0.0425) 
-0.0279 0.0098 0.0498  Actively religious in dominant 
religion  (0.0679) (0.0650) (0.0594) 
     
Number of obs.  69016 66833 68177 
R squared  0.094 0.131 0.064 
 
Panel E: Attitudes toward thriftiness and market’s fairness  






improves life  
Wealth can grow 
for everyone  
Poor are lazy 
Raised religiously  0.0120**  -0.1770*** 0.0516  0.0263 0.0003 
  (0.0057) (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0378)  (0.0035) 
Currently religious  -0.0009  0.1401*** 0.1405*** 0.1171***  0.0130*** 
  (0.0060) (0.0425) (0.0423) (0.0417)  (0.0036) 
Actively religious  -0.0112  0.1165*  0.2629*** 0.1097*  0.0096* 
  (0.0082) (0.0596) (0.0596) (0.0585)  (0.0050) 
0.0051 0.2081***  0.1381*** -0.0562 0.0077**  Raised religiously in 
dominant religion  (0.0061) (0.0425) (0.0427) (0.0420)  (0.0037) 
0.0115* -0.0943* -0.0485  -0.0012  -0.0082**  Currently religious in 
dominant religion  (0.0067) (0.0485) (0.0484) (0.0478)  (0.0041) 
-0.0055 -0.0484 -0.1243*  0.1165*  -0.0034  Actively religious in 
dominant religion  (0.0093) (0.0673) (0.0677) (0.0665)  (0.0057) 
        
Number of obs.  88696 71970 69198 67327  86305 
R squared  0.111 0.158 0.083 0.045  0.233 
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Table 4: The role of religious denominations 
Each panel reports the coefficients of an OLS regression, whose dependent variable is indicated at the top of the panel. 
Dependent variables are defined in the legend of Table 1. Regressions include the same demographic controls as in Table 2 
(health, male, age, education, social class, income; coefficients not reported), an dummy variable equal to 1 if a person does 
not believe in God, country fixed effects, and survey-year dummies. Included are also the following indicators of religious 
intensity:  “Raised religiously”:=1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question “Were you brought up religiously at 
home?”; “Currently religious”: =1 if the respondent attends religious services (apart from weddings, funerals and 
christenings) at least once a year; “Actively religious”:=1 if the respondent attend religious services (apart from weddings, 
funerals and christenings) at least once a week. Entries in columns 2 to 4 are the coefficients of the variables obtained 
interacting the corresponding variable in the first column with that in the first row. Entries in the last two columns are the 
sum of the coefficients of the specified variables. They should be interpreted as the cumulative effect of the different degree 
of religiosity, relatively to individuals who declare they have no religious affiliation. In the first three columns, standard 
errors are reported in brackets; in the last two columns p-values for the F-test that the coefficient is equal to zero are reported 
in brackets. *** indicate the coefficient is different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level , and * at the 10 % level.  
A. General trust (N. of observations: 91,656; R

















impact of religion 
Catholic -0.0132** 0.0089* 0.0431*** -0.0043 0.0388
***  0.0141
*** 
 (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.0054)  (0.4396)  (0.0000)  (0.0001) 




 (0.0076)  (0.0068)  (0.0102)  (0.0002)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Jew 0.0508  -0.0051  -0.0069  0.0457  0.0388  0.0186 
 (0.0553)  (0.0444)  (0.0717)  (0.3849)  (0.5725)  (0.4128) 
Muslim -0.0246*  0.0285* -0.0154  0.0039  -0.0115  -0.0027 
 (0.0135)  (0.0149)  (0.0162)  (0.7985)  (0.4591)  (0.7584) 
Hindu -0.0734*** 0.0712***  -0.0305* -0.0022  -0.0327
* -0.0147
* 
 (0.0208)  (0.0205)  (0.0164)  (0.9128)  (0.0777)  (0.0539) 
Buddhist -0.0154  -0.0003  0.0102  -0.0157  -0.0055  -0.0028 
 (0.0353)  (0.0230)  (0.0642)  (0.6525)  (0.9317)  (0.8590) 




 (0.0084)  (0.0079)  (0.0126)  (0.0024)  (0.0020)  (0.0007) 
 


















impact of religion 




 (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0030)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 




 (0.0041)  (0.0037)  (0.0055)  (0.0028)  (0.0006)  (0.0000) 
Jew 0.0116  0.0367  -0.0200  0.0483
* 0.0283  0.0228
* 
 (0.0290)  (0.0231)  (0.0377)  (0.0782)  (0.4327)  (0.0546) 




 (0.0071)  (0.0079)  (0.0085)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 




 (0.0109)  (0.0107)  (0.0085)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Buddhist 0.0355*  -0.0452*** 0.0600*  -0.0097 0.0503 -0.0214
*** 
 (0.0185)  (0.0120)  (0.0333)  (0.5954)  (0.1344)  (0.0094) 
Others 0.0127***  0.0031  -0.0143** 0.0158
*** 0.0015  0.0062
** 
 (0.0045)  (0.0043)  (0.0066)  (0.0012)  (0.8267)  (0.0205)  57
 















Total weighted impact 
of religion 




 (0.0157)  (0.0160)  (0.0162)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 




 (0.0224)  (0.0234)  (0.0321)  (0.0001) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Jew  0.1309 -0.0096 0.0235  0.1213  0.1448  0.0568 
 (0.1408)  (0.1270)  (0.2098)  (0.3150) (0.4312)  (0.2833) 




 (0.0277)  (0.0306)  (0.0324)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 




 (0.0446)  (0.0466)  (0.0338)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Buddhist 0.2378  -0.0272  -0.0841  0.2106  0.1265  0.0252 
 (0.1498)  (0.1539)  (0.2139)  (0.1487) (0.4733)  (0.7885) 




 (0.0186)  (0.0178)  (0.0286)  (0.0000) (0.0001)  (0.0000) 
 















Total weighted impact 
of religion 




 (0.0121)  (0.0123)  (0.0120)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 




 (0.0168)  (0.0176)  (0.0250)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Jew -0.1024  -0.0272  0.1900 -0.1296  0.0604  -0.0300 
 (0.1254)  (0.1168)  (0.1912)  (0.2442) (0.7185)  (0.5396) 




 (0.0271)  (0.0302)  (0.0322)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 




 (0.0445)  (0.0463)  (0.0336)  (0.0330) (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Buddhist -0.0142  0.0885  0.0863  0.0743  0.1606  0.0711 
 (0.0844)  (0.0752)  (0.1599)  (0.3133) (0.2892)  (0.1235) 
Others 0.0112 0.0052  0.0458*  0.0164  0.0622
** 0.0170
* 
 (0.0172)  (0.0168)  (0.0257)  (0.3765) (0.0105)  (0.0926) 
 















Total weighted impact 
of religion 




 (0.0171)  (0.0173)  (0.0165)  (0.0051) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Protestant 0.0285  0.0175  0.0595  0.0460  0.1055
*** 0.0388
*** 
 (0.0253)  (0.0267)  (0.0379)  (0.1030) (0.0014)  (0.0028) 
Jew 0.0978  0.0177  -0.4662*  0.1155  -0.3507  -0.0227 
 (0.1635)  (0.1416)  (0.2636)  (0.4107) (0.1319)  (0.7174) 
Muslim -0.0180  0.0323  0.2072***  0.0143  0.2215
*** 0.0812
*** 
 (0.0277)  (0.0304)  (0.0326)  (0.6507) (0.0000)
  (0.0000) 
Hindu -0.0055  0.1488**  -0.1417**  0.1433
** 0.0016  0.0585 
 (0.0625)  (0.0677)  (0.0551)  (0.0108) (0.9747)  (0.3542) 
Buddhist  0.2190 -0.0893 0.0078  0.1297  0.1375  -0.0184 
 (0.2473)  (0.2489)  (0.3009)  (0.5674) (0.5659)  (0.9016) 
Others 0.0021 0.0120  -0.0209  0.0141  -0.0068  0.0057 
 (0.0201)  (0.0191)  (0.0306)  (0.5188) (0.8132)  (0.6347) 
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Total weighted impact 
of religion 




 (0.0103)  (0.0102)  (0.0104)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 




 (0.0146)  (0.0133)  (0.0195)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 




 (0.1065)  (0.0857)  (0.1382)  (0.0354) (0.0441)  (0.0128) 




 (0.0262)  (0.0289)  (0.0311)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 




 (0.0400)  (0.0393)  (0.0315)  (0.0040) (0.0315)  (0.0169) 




 (0.0677)  (0.0440)  (0.1217)  (0.0000) (0.0020)  (0.0004) 




 (0.0165)  (0.0159)  (0.0243)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
G. Is it justified to cheat on taxes? (N. of observations: 86,627 =; R

















impact of religion 




  (0.0295) (0.0291) (0.0296)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 




  (0.0418) (0.0378) (0.0557)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Jew -0.4927*  0.0924  -1.1119*** -0.4003 -1.5122
*** -0.3494
*** 
  (0.2990) (0.2409) (0.3899)  (0.1588)  (0.0001)  (0.0045) 




  (0.0899) (0.0950) (0.1042)  (0.0112)  (0.0247)  (0.0045) 




  (0.1144) (0.1121) (0.0895)  (0.0034)
  (0.0001)  (0.0007) 
Buddhist 0.0372  0.0428  -0.3887  0.0800  -0.3087  0.0084 
  (0.1931) (0.1280) (0.3542)  (0.6754)  (0.3841)  (0.9233) 
Others -0.1278*** 0.1126** -0.4630*** -0.0152 -0.4782
*** -0.0671
** 
  (0.0474) (0.0457) (0.0696)  (0.7662)  (0.0000)  (0.0153) 
 
H. Is it justified to accept a bribe? (N. of observations: 87,082 =; R














Total weighted impact 
of religion 




 (0.0200)  (0.0197)  (0.0201)  (0.0276) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Protestant 0.0251  -0.0608**  -0.1846***  -0.0357  -0.2203
*** -0.0704
*** 
 (0.0283)  (0.0256)  (0.0378)  (0.2545) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Jew -0.0348  0.0263  -0.2133 -0.0085  -0.2218  -0.0355 
 (0.2047)  (0.1645)  (0.2706)  (0.9651) (0.3915)  (0.6743) 




 (0.0605)  (0.0640)  (0.0701)  (0.0000) (0.0001)  (0.0000) 




 (0.0774)  (0.0757)  (0.0606)  (0.0067) (0.0538)  (0.0193) 
Buddhist -0.0233  -0.0198  -0.4060*  -0.0431  -0.4491
* -0.0539 
 (0.1314)  (0.0868)  (0.2379)  (0.7401) (0.0600)  (0.3649) 
Others -0.0586* 0.0257  -0.1924***  -0.0329  -0.2253
*** -0.0451
** 
 (0.0317)  (0.0306)  (0.0467)  (0.3371) (0.0000)  (0.0152)  59
 
 
I. Accept more income inequality to provide incentives? (N. of obs.: 69,016 =; R














Total weighted impact 
of religion 
Catholic  -0.0100 -0.0290 -0.0050  -0.0390  -0.0440  -0.0308 
 (0.0404)  (0.0413)  (0.0411)  (0.3438) (0.3070)  (0.2496) 
Protestant 0.0272  -0.0612  0.1821**  -0.0340  0.1481
** 0.0220 
 (0.0550)  (0.0572)  (0.0831)  (0.5690) (0.0474)  (0.4393) 
Jew -0.6147  0.3402  -1.0308 -0.2745  -1.3053
** -0.2493 
 (0.4297)  (0.3864)  (0.6403)  (0.4471) (0.0201)  (0.1164) 




 (0.0900)  (0.1001)  (0.1058)  (0.0001) (0.0359)  (0.0004) 
Hindu 0.2512*  -0.0920  0.0509  0.1592  0.2101
* 0.1552
* 
 (0.1443)  (0.1510)  (0.1106)  (0.2333) (0.0903)  (0.0598) 
Buddhist -0.3905  0.2837  0.1453  -0.1068  0.0385  0.1404 
 (0.2782)  (0.2515)  (0.5138)  (0.6641) (0.9373)  (0.3622) 
Others -0.2158*** 0.0053  0.0813  -0.2105
*** -0.1292  -0.0926
*** 
 (0.0563)  (0.0548)  (0.0844)  (0.0005) (0.1051)  (0.0052) 
 
J. Private ownership should be increased? (N. of obs.: 66,833 =; R














Total weighted impact 
of religion 




 (0.0389)  (0.0399)  (0.0398)  (0.0003) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 




 (0.0524)  (0.0544)  (0.0793)  (0.0000) (0.0205)  (0.0002) 
Jew -0.0314  -0.3337  0.5569 -0.3651  0.1918  -0.1129 
 (0.3951)  (0.3604)  (0.6107)  (0.2795) (0.7218)  (0.4538) 
Muslim -0.0996 0.1802*  -0.2557***  0.0806  -0.1751
* -0.0337 
 (0.0835)  (0.0928)  (0.0989)  (0.3883) (0.0678)  (0.5389) 
Hindu  0.4198*** -0.5407*** 0.3825***  -0.1209  0.2616
** 0.0636 
 (0.1363)  (0.1424)  (0.1042)  (0.3365) (0.0249)  (0.0693) 
Buddhist -0.2157  0.5095**  0.1453  0.2938  0.4391  0.3504
*** 
 (0.2781)  (0.2546)  (0.5162)  (0.2345) (0.3679)  (0.0246) 
Others -0.3254***  -0.0060 0.3951***  -0.3314
*** 0.0637  -0.1029
*** 
 (0.0532)  (0.0518)  (0.0798)  (0.0000) (0.3989)  (0.0011) 
 
K. Competition is good (N. of obs.: 68,177 =; R














Total weighted impact 
of religion 




 (0.0353)  (0.0361)  (0.0360)  (0.0004) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Protestant 0.1043**  0.0133  -0.0758  0.1176
** 0.0418  0.0384 
 (0.0479)  (0.0498)  (0.0724)  (0.0235) (0.5212)  (0.1218) 
Jew 0.1226  0.2360  0.1852 0.3586  0.5438  0.2196 
 (0.3687)  (0.3339)  (0.5556)  (0.2510) (0.2643)  (0.1116) 




 (0.0773)  (0.0861)  (0.0914)  (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0000) 




 (0.1253)  (0.1309)  (0.0957)  (0.0001) (0.0005)  (0.0000) 
Buddhist -0.1674  0.3359  -0.8956**  0.1685  -0.7271
* 0.1431 
 (0.2410)  (0.2172)  (0.4516)  (0.4303) (0.0900)  (0.2837) 
Others -0.0494 0.0352  -0.1921***  -0.0142  -0.2063
*** -0.0338 
 (0.0494)  (0.0481)  (0.0742)  (0.7895) (0.0032)  (0.2447) 
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L. Thrift to be taught to children  (N. of obs.: 88,696 =; R














Total weighted impact 
of religion 




 (0.0055)  (0.0054)  (0.0056)  (0.0009) (0.0266)  (0.0020) 
Protestant 0.0115  0.0174**  -0.0294***  0.0289
*** -0.0005  0.0085
** 
 (0.0078)  (0.0070)  (0.0103)  (0.0008) (0.9580)  (0.0366) 
Jew 0.0301  0.0197  -0.0251 0.0498  0.0247  0.0205 
 (0.0557)  (0.0447)  (0.0727)  (0.3478) (0.7227)  (0.3711) 
Muslim 0.0574***  -0.0310**  -0.0525***  0.0264
* -0.0261  -0.0002 
 (0.0137)  (0.0151)  (0.0163)  (0.0876) (0.0987)  (0.9851) 
Hindu 0.0352*  0.0027  -0.0197  0.0379
* 0.0182  0.0230 
 (0.0210)  (0.0207)  (0.0166)  (0.0634) (0.3322)  (0.1086) 
Buddhist  -0.0553 0.0507** -0.0383  -0.0046  -0.0429  0.0230 
 (0.0356)  (0.0232)  (0.0647)  (0.8965) (0.5104)  (0.1494) 
Others 0.0274***  -0.0062  -0.0407***  0.0212
** -0.0195  0.0028 




M. Poor are lazy  (N. of obs.: 86,305 =; R














Total weighted impact 
of religion 




 (0.0033)  (0.0033)  (0.0033)  (0.0925) (0.0078)  (0.0074) 




 (0.0047)  (0.0043)  (0.0063)  (0.0168)  (0.0002)
 ** (0.0004) 
Jew  0.0323 -0.0288 0.0350  0.0035  0.0385  0.0037 
 (0.0344)  (0.0273)  (0.0438)  (0.9147) (0.3596)  (0.7903) 




 (0.0086)  (0.0096)  (0.0101)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 




 (0.0129)  (0.0126)  (0.0101)  (0.0000) (0.0007)  (0.0000) 
Buddhist  0.0107 -0.0125 0.0538  -0.0018  0.0520  -0.0026 
 (0.0214)  (0.0139)  (0.0394)  (0.9308) (0.1927)  (0.7816) 
Others  0.0142*** -0.0206*** 0.0357***  -0.0064  0.0293
*** -0.0007 
 (0.0053)  (0.0052)  (0.0078)  (0.2632) (0.0001)  (0.8042) 
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Table 5. Interacting religious denominations and dominant religion 
 
Each panel reports the coefficients of an OLS regression, whose dependent variable is indicated at the top of the panel. 
All the dependent variables are defined in the legend of Table 1. In columns 1-3 the sample is restricted to countries 
where the dominant religion is Catholic, in columns 4-6 to countries where the dominant religion is Protestant, 
columns 7-9 where the dominant religion is Muslim. All regressions include as control variable (coefficients not 
reported) the same demographic controls as in Table 2 (health, male, age, education, social class, income), an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if a person answer no to the question “Do you believe in God?”, a country fixed effect, and survey-
year dummies. In addition these regressions include the following three indicators of religious intensity:  “Raised 
religiously” equal to one if the respondent answered positively to the question “Were you brought up religiously at 
home?”; “Currently religious” equal to one if the respondent attend religious services (apart from weddings, funerals 
and christenings) at least once a year; “Actively religious” is equal to one if the respondent attend religious services 
(apart from weddings, funerals and christenings) at least once a week. We report the coefficient of these variables in a 
cumulative way. Thus, the first column reports the coefficient on the dummy “raised religiously”, the second column 
the sum of the coefficients of the dummies “raised religiously” and “currently religious”, the third column the sum of 
the coefficients of the dummies “raised religiously”, “currently religious”, and “actively religious”. Below the 
coefficient in bracket we report the p-values for the F-test that the coefficient is equal to zero (second and third 
column). *** indicate the coefficient is different from zero at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level , and * at the 
10 percent level.  
 
Panel A:  General trust 
  Dominant religion: 
  Catholic Protestant Muslim 
  Religious intensity  Religious intensity  Religious intensity 















              
Catholic -0.0108*  -0.0019  0.0437
***  -0.0043  0.0289
** 0.0716
***  -0.0533 -0.0103  0.1286
***
  (0.1010)  (0.7669 )  (0.0000 )  (0.7920)  (0.0173 )  (0.0000 )  (0.5830)  (0.8502 )  (0.0012 ) 
Protestant -0.0181  0.0213  0.0595
***  0.0039  0.0384
*** 0.0898
***  0.0014  0.6086
*** 0.3112
* 
  (0.3530)  (0.3712 )  (0.0019 )  (0.6080)  ( 0.0002)  (0.0000 )  (0.9940)  ( 0.0000)  ( 0.0750) 
Jew  0.0251 -0.0782 -0.2271 0.1128 0.1110 0.0055 -0.3103 -0.2016  -0.2552 
  (0.8180)  ( 0.4822)  (0.2030)  (0.4990)  ( 0.3528)  ( 0.2346)  (0.3550)  ( 0.4383)  ( 0.4879) 
Muslim 0.0620  -0.0170  0.1280 -0.0191
** -0.2931
*  0.0221 -0.0084 -0.0006  -0.0122 
  (0.4250)  (0.8756 )  (0.2370 )  (0.0330)  ( 0.0874)  ( 0.8996)  (0.5300)  ( 0.9685)  ( 0.4900) 
Hindu  -0.0049 0.0262 -0.0105 0.1569 -0.1751  0.2074 0.0016  0.0174  0.0061 
  (0.9590)  ( 0.8529)  (0.8482 )  (0.6580)  ( 0.7767)  ( 0.7076)  (0.9740)  ( 0.7787)  ( 0.9051) 
Buddhist 0.4788***  0.9122
***  0.1953 -0.2901* -0.1351  -0.1988  0.1577  0.1577  0.1577 
  (0.0000)  (0.0001)  (0.1663 )  (0.0650)  ( 0.3391)  ( 0.3974)  (0.4590)  ( 0.4587)  ( 0.4587) 
Others 0.0282 0.0425  0.0471
**  -0.0345 0.0176  -0.0012  0.0864*  0.1419
***  0.0303 
  (0.2520)  ( 0.2074)  (0.0324 )  (0.2170)  (0.5449 )  (0.8141 )  (0.0720)  ( 0.0003)  (0.6423 ) 
R
2  0.066 0.104  0.058 






Panel B:  Intolerance towards immigrants and other races    
  Dominant religion: 
  Catholic Protestant  Muslim 
  Religious intensity  Religious intensity  Religious intensity 















            
Catholic 0.0022 0.0237
*** 0.0271
***  -0.0144** 0.0008  -0.0058  -0.0876  0.0100  0.0613
***
 (0.5770)  (0.0000  )  (0.0000 )  (0.0280)  (0.9021 )  (0.4057 )  (0.1220)  (0.7520 )  (0.0084 )
Protestant -0.0043  0.0304
**  -0.0202 0.0104**  0.0213
*** 0.0337
***  -0.0337 -0.0261  0.0987 
  (0.7430)  (0.0212 )  (0.1015 )  (0.0210)  (0.0000) (0.0000 )  (0.7460)  ( 0.6420)  ( 0.3326)
Jew -0.0297  -0.0008  -0.2157
**  0.0163 0.0520 0.0599 -0.2081  -0.2787
*  -0.1249 
  (0.6430)  ( 0.9897)  ( 0.0435)  (0.9490)  ( 0.1449)  ( 0.1296)  (0.2870)  ( 0.0659)  ( 0.5601)
Muslim  -0.0195 0.0545 0.0143 0.0421 -0.0243 0.0448 -0.0012  0.0581
*** 0.0709
***
  (0.6560)  ( 0.3782)  ( 0.8120)  (0.3430)  ( 0.5887)  ( 0.3789)  (0.8750)  (0.0000) (0.0000)
Hindu 0.1177**  0.2636
***  0.0321 0.0204 0.0194 0.0352  0.0735**  0.0328  0.0536
* 
  (0.0350)  ( 0.0008)  ( 0.3121)  (0.6790)  ( 0.6861)  ( 0.4771)  (0.0140)  ( 0.3647)  ( 0.0745)
Buddhist  0.0035 0.0940 0.0041  0.1285*  0.0572  0.1855
*  -0.1179 -0.1179  -0.1179 
  (0.9630)  ( 0.5398)  ( 0.9594)  (0.0770)  ( 0.3827)  (0.0906 )  (0.3420)  ( 0.3415)  ( 0.3415)
Others -0.0415***  -0.0504
**  -0.0028 0.0239** -0.0032  0.0015  0.0109  -0.0004  -0.0105 
  (0.0060)  ( 0.0131)  ( 0.8289)  (0.0420)  ( 0.8017)  (0.9054 )  (0.7030)  ( 0.9861)  (0.7827 )
R
2  0.168 0.167  0.124 
N. observ.  33324  25242  4901 
Panel C: Trust in the government 
  Dominant religion: 
  Catholic Protestant  Muslim 
  Religious intensity  Religious intensity  Religious intensity 















            
Catholic 0.0389** 0.1784
*** 0.2102
***  -0.0466  0.1206
*** 0.1921
***  -0.4585**  -0.2617
**  -0.0515 
 (0.0390)  (0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  (0.2070) (0.0004  )  (0.0000 )  (0.0370)  (0.0346 )  (0.5692 ) 
Protestant 0.1600***  0.1541
** 0.2463
***  -0.0118  0.1162
*** 0.1368
***  -0.6806*  0.4067
**  0.0347 
 (0.0050)  (  0.0120)  (0.0000 )  (0.6110)  (0.0000) (0.0000 )  (0.0910)  ( 0.0469)  ( 0.9300) 
Jew -0.1177  -0.2648  -1.1877
*  -0.1556 0.0093 0.3149
*  1.8214* 0.3543  0.3543 
  (0.7080)  ( 0.3910)  ( 0.0576)  (0.3470)  ( 0.9495)  ( 0.0799)  (0.0740)  ( 0.6703)  ( 0.6703) 
Muslim 0.1180  0.2978  0.2642  0.9596***  0.5655
*** 0.9825
***  0.1322***  0.2348
*** 0.3607
***
  (0.7240)  ( 0.3136)  ( 0.4149)  (0.0000)  ( 0.0047)  ( 0.0006)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000 )
Hindu -0.2567 0.4138 0.1163 0.5224 0.3210  0.6813
**  0.3829***  0.5649
*** 0.4863
***
  (0.2280)  ( 0.1537)  ( 0.3282)  (0.3240)  ( 0.2574)  ( 0.0162)  (0.0010)  ( 0.0001)  (0.0000)
Buddhist  0.1230 1.1053  -0.0912  -0.0486 0.0798 0.0908 0.2807 0.2807  0.2807 
  (0.7880)  ( 0.2548)  ( 0.7970)  (0.8660)  ( 0.7356)  ( 0.8337)  (0.5600)  ( 0.5597)  ( 0.5597) 
Others 0.0426  0.1960
** 0.1148
**  0.1427***  0.1170
** 0.1048
**  0.0018  0.2876
*** 0.3846
***
  (0.5090)  ( 0.0369)  ( 0.0296)  (0.0030)  ( 0.0168)  (0.0498 )  (0.9870)  ( 0.0015)  (0.0092)
R
2 0.090  0.109  0.217 
N. observ.  17023  9761  4836  63
Panel D: Men deserve scarce jobs more than women    
  Dominant religion: 
  Catholic Protestant  Muslim 
  Religious intensity  Religious intensity  Religious intensity 















            
Catholic 0.0717*** 0.0707
*** 0.1144
***  0.0129 0.0091  0.1363
***  0.1402 0.0841  0.0993 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  (0.6800)  (0.7432 )  (0.0000 )  (0.5480)  (0.5053 )  (0.2846 )
Protestant 0.0109  0.0444  0.1074
***  0.0925***  0.0700
*** 0.1591
***  0.9278**  0.3693
*  0.5903 
  (0.8080)  ( 0.3411)  ( 0.0053)  (0.0000)  ( 0.0007)  ( 0.0000)  (0.0250)  ( 0.0784)  ( 0.1453)
Jew  0.0400 -0.1563 -0.2384 -0.2028 -0.2457
*  0.0823 -2.1880***  -1.1833
**  -0.9660 
  (0.8660)  ( 0.5214)  ( 0.5779)  (0.2000)  (0.0923 )  (0.6410 )  (0.0050)  ( 0.0498)  ( 0.2576)
Muslim  0.2934*  0.2120 0.1127 0.1769  0.6243
***  0.4648 0.0489  0.2101
*** 0.3254
***
  (0.0850)  ( 0.3621)  ( 0.6327)  (0.2700)  ( 0.0014)  ( 0.0782)  (0.1200)  (0.0000) (0.0000)
Hindu 0.3029  0.5637
** 0.1987
*  0.6136  0.6451
*** 0.8059
***  0.2465** 0.1543  0.1294 
  (0.1390)  ( 0.0497)  ( 0.0871)  (0.1220)  ( 0.0046)  ( 0.0038)  (0.0400)  ( 0.2840)  ( 0.2822)
Buddhist -0.1543  0.5227  -0.3613  0.4601
*  0.1964 0.3833  0.8516*  0.8516
* 0.8516
* 
  (0.5260)  ( 0.3113)  ( 0.2205)  (0.0770)  ( 0.4274)  ( 0.3991)  (0.0840)  ( 0.0844)  ( 0.0844)
Others -0.0340  -0.0448  0.1372
***  0.0799* 0.0219  0.1956
***  -0.0839 -0.1493  -0.0569 
  (0.5120)  ( 0.5329)  ( 0.0026)  (0.9140)  ( 0.6392)  ( 0.0001)  (0.4520)  ( 0.1021)  ( 0.7067)
R
2  0.101 0.132  0.098 
N. observ.  31750  16658  4934 
Panel E: Men deserve university education more than women    
  Dominant religion: 
  Catholic Protestant  Muslim 
  Religious intensity  Religious intensity  Religious intensity 















            
Catholic 0.0258  0.0293 0.0653
***  0.0047 0.0329  0.1077
**  -0.4091  0.4985
***  0.0921 
  (0.1720)  (0.1587 )  (0.0022 )  (0.9130)  (0.3943 )  (0.0175 )  (0.1190)  (0.0005 )  (0.3775 )
Protestant 0.0687  0.2262
*** 0.1089
**  -0.0056 0.0069  0.0838
**  -0.0393 0.2457  0.3805 
  (0.3200)  ( 0.0054)  ( 0.0293)  (0.8230)  ( 0.8120)  (0.0392 )  (0.9320)  ( 0.2976)  ( 0.4036)
Jew  0.1716 -0.0497 0.0680 -0.0877 -0.0338  -0.3846
*  -0.5207 0.3914  -0.8165 
  (0.6800)  ( 0.8887)  ( 0.9307)  (0.6480)  ( 0.8577)  ( 0.0875)  (0.5860)  ( 0.5636)  ( 0.3945)
Muslim  0.6165**  -0.5001 0.2924 -0.0532 -0.0256 -0.0099 -0.0427 -0.0024  0.2406
***
  (0.0320)  ( 0.1043)  (0.4039 )  (0.8350)  ( 0.8930)  ( 0.9739)  (0.2280)  ( 0.9580)  ( 0.0000)
Hindu  0.0377 0.1848 0.1122 -0.2364  0.6932
** 1.1430
***  0.0965 0.0850  0.2386
* 
  (0.8540)  ( 0.5073)  ( 0.3189)  (0.6480)  ( 0.0126)  (0.0071 )  (0.5080)  ( 0.6045)  ( 0.0786)
Buddhist  1.2845** 0.4402  0.4402 -0.3597 -0.1570 -0.8293 0.9684* 0.9684
* 0.9684
* 
  (0.0200)  ( 0.2608)  ( 0.2608)  (0.2210)  ( 0.5224)  ( 0.2580)  (0.0810)  ( 0.0809)  ( 0.0809)
Others 0.0109  -0.0132  -0.0636  0.0210  0.1323
** 0.1310
**  0.1594  0.5211
*** 0.7546
***
  (0.8720) (  0.8863) (0.2234) (0.7080) (  0.0130) (  0.0325) (0.2090)  (0.0000) (0.0000)
R
2  0.078 0.180  0.092 
N. observ.  15126  7885  4880  64
Panel F: Trust in the legal system    
  Dominant religion: 
  Catholic Protestant  Muslim 
  Religious intensity  Religious intensity  Religious intensity 















            
Catholic 0.0396*** 0.1573
*** 0.2427
***  0.0314  0.1112
*** 0.1416
***  -0.3785*  -0.4973
*** -0.1871
**
  (0.0030)  (0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  (0.1710)  (0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  (0.0910)  (0.0000 )  (0.0368 )
Protestant 0.0784*  0.1787
*** 0.2556
***  0.0458***  0.1327
*** 0.1827
***  -0.2884  0.4416
**  -0.1577 
  (0.0640)  ( 0.0001)  ( 0.0000)  (0.0040)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.4680)  ( 0.0338)  ( 0.6861)
Jew  -0.0546 -0.0183 -0.0257 0.1244 0.2108
*  0.2918 0.2926 -1.3066  -0.7308 
  (0.8080)  ( 0.9358)  (0.9438 )  (0.3210)  ( 0.0906)  ( 0.346)  (0.7710)  ( 0.1115)  ( 0.3736)
Muslim 0.5413***  0.3470  0.4073
*  0.5366*** 0.1370 0.5076
***  0.1090***  0.1568
*** 0.2332
***
  (0.0010) (  0.1516) (  0.0658) (0.0010) (  0.3804) (  0.0042) (0.0000) (  0.0001)  (0.0000)
Hindu -0.0201  -0.4270 0.0627 0.2360 0.2047 0.2666  0.2095*  0.1418  0.0869 
  (0.9220)  ( 0.1385)  ( 0.5939)  (0.1780)  ( 0.2337)  ( 0.1291)  (0.0670)  ( 0.3067)  ( 0.4506)
Buddhist  0.0681 0.1867 0.4477  0.6011**  0.4516
*  -0.0334 0.1705 0.1705  0.1705 
  (0.7780)  ( 0.6868)  ( 0.1211)  (0.0200)  ( 0.0588)  ( 0.9305)  (0.7200)  ( 0.7196)  ( 0.7196)
Others -0.0534  -0.0244  0.0812
*  -0.0188  0.0810
* 0.1883
***  -0.2302** -0.0111  -0.0745 
  (0.2930) (  0.7281) (  0.0753) (0.6490) (  0.0630)  (0.0000)  (0.0330)  ( 0.9007)  ( 0.6091)
R
2  0.057 0.108  0.103 
N. observ.  38368  22779  4870 
Panel G: Is it justified to cheat on taxes?  
  Dominant religion: 
  Catholic Protestant  Muslim 
  Religious intensity  Religious intensity  Religious intensity 















            
Catholic -0.1584*** -0.1942
*** -0.4017
***  -0.0957  -0.2945
*** -0.5684
***  0.3979  1.0316
***  0.3657 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  (0.1610)  (0.0000 )  (0.0000 )  (0.5390)  (0.0025 )  (0.1493 )
Protestant -0.4182***  -0.3775
*** -0.6874
***  -0.1608***  -0.4751
*** -0.9851
***  -0.0270 0.5164  1.1428 
 (0.0000)  (  0.0032)  (0.0000)  (0.0010)  (0.0000) (0.0000 )  (0.9810)  ( 0.3592)  ( 0.3535)
Jew  -1.1388*  -0.5202 -1.5856 -0.0816 0.0426  -1.4567
***  0.3057 -1.5506  2.0666 
  (0.0740)  ( 0.4207)  ( 0.1266)  (0.8260)  ( 0.9083)  ( 0.0004)  (0.8830)  ( 0.3362)  ( 0.3648)
Muslim  -0.0796 -1.0572 -0.3294 -0.0887 -0.3321 -0.6415 -0.1702 0.0191  0.0081 
  (0.8600)  ( 0.1008)  ( 0.6004)  (0.8480)  ( 0.4767)  ( 0.2300)  (0.1130)  ( 0.8801)  ( 0.9538)
Hindu 0.6037  0.7268  -0.6391
*  -0.5929  -1.6180
*** -1.3761
***  -0.1980 -0.0330  -0.1212 
  (0.3010)  ( 0.3748)  ( 0.0537)  (0.2470)  ( 0.0012)  ( 0.0076)  (0.5390)  ( 0.9327)  ( 0.7140)
Buddhist  -0.2321 -1.3573 -0.9988 -0.4868 -0.2457 -0.3671 -0.3387 -0.3387  -0.3387 
  (0.7350)  ( 0.3020)  ( 0.2236)  (0.5180)  ( 0.7172)  ( 0.7464)  (0.7980)  ( 0.7976)  ( 0.7976)
Others 0.0119  -0.2171  -0.6833
***  -0.1547 0.0577  -0.9370
***  0.2266  0.6301
**  0.6445 
 (0.9340)  (0.2767  )  (0.0000 )  (0.2070) (  0.6570)  (0.0000)  (0.4780)  ( 0.0115)  (0.1151 )
R
2  0.085 0.098  0.187 
N. observ.  38041  25078  3638  65
Panel H: Is it justified to accept a bribe?  
  Dominant religion: 
  Catholic Protestant  Muslim 
  Religious intensity  Religious intensity  Religious intensity 















            
Catholic -0.0497*  -0.0301 -0.0875
***  -0.0833** -0.0244 -0.2263
***  -0.1291 0.0289  0.1134 
  (0.0610) (0.3094  ) (0.0039  ) (0.0440) (0.5676  )  (0.0000 )  (0.7860)  (0.9109 )  (0.5552 )
Protestant -0.0990  -0.1406  -0.1717
**  -0.0095  -0.0727
** -0.2842
***  0.6284 0.0713  0.6320 
  (0.2350) (  0.1137) (  0.0218) (07370.) (  0.0238)  (0.0000)  (0.4700)  ( 0.8677)  ( 0.5001)
Jew -0.2778  0.8085
*  -0.1224 0.2170  0.1035 -0.0897 -0.1808 -1.1195  -0.7599 
  (0.5300)  ( 0.0716)  ( 0.8652)  (0.3410)  ( 0.6462)  ( 0.7243)  (0.9170)  ( 0.3617)  ( 0.6615)
Muslim  0.5425* -0.0911 -0.3925 -0.4244 0.2388 -0.3307  0.5578***  -0.3286
*** 0.3735
***
  (0.0910)  ( 0.8429)  ( 0.3856)  (0.1300)  ( 0.3975)  ( 0.3099)  (0.0000)  ( 0.0007)  ( 0.0004)
Hindu  0.4590 -0.6577 0.0120  0.0159 -0.1671 -0.1098 -0.3296 -0.2657  -0.4389
* 
  (0.2570)  ( 0.2476)  ( 0.9581)  (0.9590)  ( 0.5805)  (0.7252 )  (0.1790)  ( 0.3774)  ( 0.0810)
Buddhist  0.1576 -0.8962 -0.4262 -0.0874 0.3964  0.1470 -0.4185 -0.4185  -0.4185 
  (0.7410)  ( 0.3265)  ( 0.4545)  (0.8480)  ( 0.3351)  (0.8310 )  (0.6770)  ( 0.6771)  ( 0.6771)
Others 0.1546  -0.1458  -0.1483
*  -0.0633 0.0491  -0.2427
***  0.0690 -0.1606  -0.1654 
  (0.1200)  ( 0.2881)  ( 0.0949)  (0.3910)  ( 0.5293)  (0.0035 )  (0.7770)  ( 0.3974)  ( 0.5952)
R
2 0.071  0.062  0.182 
N. observ.  37997  25097  3676 
Panel I: Accept more income inequality to provide incentives?  
  Dominant religion: 
  Catholic Protestant Muslim 
  Religious intensity  Religious intensity  Religious intensity 















              
Catholic 0.0430  -0.0215  -0.0592 -0.1625* -0.0175  -0.0830  -0.0463  0.2804 -0.0713 
  (0.3850)  (0.6954 )  (0.3006 )  (0.1000)  (0.8415 )  (0.3594)  (0.9540)  (0.5271 )  (0.8267 ) 
Protestant  -0.1694  -0.1080 0.1502 0.0685 0.0768 0.1966
**  -0.5815  -1.5222
**  -0.8288 
  (0.2930)  ( 0.5083)  ( 0.3001)  (0.2200)  ( 0.2354)  ( 0.0288)  (0.6890)  ( 0.0397)  ( 0.5620) 
Jew  -0.1534 0.3268 -0.9852 -0.1545 0.0817 -1.1616
**  -2.7138 -0.5617  -2.4224 
  (0.8540)  ( 0.9853)  ( 0.5004)  (0.7710)  ( 0.8597)  ( 0.0439)  (0.3220)  ( 0.7918)  ( 0.4208) 
Muslim  -0.1035 -0.4495 0.4705 -1.0102 0.3998  0.1319  -0.4514***  -0.5294
*** -0.2666
* 
  (0.8560)  ( 0.5707)  ( 0.5585)  (0.1520)  ( 0.5152)  ( 0.8737)  (0.0000)  ( 0.0002)  ( 0.0703) 
Hindu -1.0495 0.2702 -0.1749 1.4653 -0.5349  0.4739  -0.0686 0.2162 0.2498 
  (0.1410)  ( 0.7828)  ( 0.6624)  (0.4020)  ( 0.4549)  ( 0.5886)  (0.8700)  ( 0.6743)  ( 0.5538) 
Buddhist  -0.7120 2.0342 -0.6609 -0.4101 -0.5138  -0.1553  1.8131  1.8131 1.8131 
  (0.3910)  ( 0.2479)  ( 0.5112)  (0.6610)  ( 0.5090)  ( 0.9135)  (0.2980)  ( 0.2976)  ( 0.2976) 
Others  0.2740 -0.0610 0.1265 -0.2055  0.3697
**  0.0295 -1.0764***  -1.1981
*** -1.8094
*** 
  (0.1240)  ( 0.8020)  ( 0.4169)  (0.1500)  ( 0.0118)  ( 0.8567)  (0.0060)  ( 0.0002)  ( 0.0007) 
R
2  0.076 0.109  0.079 
N. observ.  28956  16693  4803  66
Panel J: Private ownership should be increased?  
  Dominant religion: 
  Catholic Protestant Muslim 
  Religious intensity  Religious intensity  Religious intensity 















            
Catholic -0.0503  0.1040
** 0.1706
***  -0.1132 -0.0550 0.1579
*  -0.7320 -0.0386  -1.0111
*** 
  (0.2710)  (0.0396 )  (0.0013 )  (0.2060)  (0.4854 )  (0.0537 )  (0.3670)  (0.9322 )  (0.0025 ) 
Protestant 0.1406  0.1435  -0.0508  0.1298*** 0.1692
***  0.1195 1.1276 -0.9636  1.3960 
  (0.3440)  ( 0.3390)  ( 0.7035)  (0.0100)  ( 0.0037)  ( 0.1405)  (0.4480)  ( 0.2027)  ( 0.3394) 
Jew  -0.6272  -0.3629 0.3934 0.6675 0.0892 -0.0508 0.1958 -0.9106  -0.0438 
  (0.4270)  ( 0.6212)  ( 0.7966)  (0.1410)  ( 0.8261)  ( 0.9212)  (0.9440)  ( 0.6754)  ( 0.9886) 
Muslim  0.7798 0.1583 0.8031 -0.9323  -0.8805  -1.1094  -0.2171*  0.0568  -0.4189
*** 
  (0.1500)  ( 0.8295)  ( 0.2672)  (0.1380)  ( 0.1081)  ( 0.1340)  (0.0560)  ( 0.6960)  ( 0.0051) 
Hindu 0.6009  1.3444  -0.8386
**  -1.1293 -0.5723  -1.6348
**  0.4778 -0.0032  0.2157 
  (0.3490)  ( 0.1275)  ( 0.0191)  (0.4690)  ( 0.3701)  ( 0.0365)  (0.2730)  ( 0.9951)  ( 0.6193) 
Buddhist -0.1937  -0.5825  0.2054  -0.1913  -1.1990 1.3500 -0.9618 -0.9618  -0.9618 
  (0.7980)  ( 0.7135)  ( 0.8254)  (0.8220)  ( 0.1008)  ( 0.2898)  (0.5890)  ( 0.5888)  (0.5888 ) 
Others -0.1817  -0.0916 0.0881  -0.2406*  -0.6109
***  -0.1329 -0.2521  -0.9405
***  -0.1767 
  (0.2620)  ( 0.6862)  ( 0.5390)  (0.0610)  (0.0000)  ( 0.3669)  (0.5320)  ( 0.0040)  ( 0.7474) 
R
2  0.100 0.113  0.069 
N. observ.  27293  16674  4890 
Panel K: Competition is good  
  Dominant religion: 
  Catholic Protestant  Muslim 
  Religious intensity  Religious intensity  Religious intensity 















              
Catholic 0.1797***  0.1270
**  0.1352 -0.0270 0.1033  0.0133  0.2719 0.6721
*  0.3677 
  (0.0000)  (0.0101 )  (0.0087 )  (0.7450)  (0.1589 )  (0.8610 )  (0.6780)  (0.0582 )  (0.1580 )
Protestant 0.0868  0.0631  -0.0552  0.1301*** 0.1695
*** 0.1404
*  0.5592 -0.1659  0.5721 
  (0.5480)  ( 0.6678)  ( 0.6721)  (0.0060)  ( 0.0019)  ( 0.0626)  (0.6290)  ( 0.7783)  ( 0.6154)
Jew  -0.1024 0.2114 1.2025 0.5336 0.6104  0.4093 -1.1829  -0.3186  -0.0462 
  (0.8910)  ( 0.7695)  ( 0.3579)  (0.2210)  ( 0.1128)  ( 0.3974)  (0.5880)  ( 0.8508)  ( 0.9846)
Muslim  -0.1834  -0.1340  -0.0433 -1.3036** -0.5487  -0.3815 -0.4038***  -0.1800  -0.1701 
  (0.7250)  ( 0.8503)  ( 0.9539)  (0.0280)  ( 0.2874)  ( 0.5840)  (0.0000)  ( 0.1141)  ( 0.1457)
Hindu -0.6451  -2.3619
*** -0.9490
***  -0.7613 0.4366  -0.9935 -0.0374 -0.4398  0.1260 
  (0.3010)  ( 0.0070)  ( 0.0074)  (0.6040)  ( 0.4676)  ( 0.1769)  (0.9110)  ( 0.2772)  ( 0.7097)
Buddhist  -0.2553 0.8376 -0.9718 0.1238 0.2238  0.9623  -0.1892 -0.1892  -0.1892 
  (0.7310)  ( 0.5949)  ( 0.2802)  (0.8750)  ( 0.7319)  (0.4228 )  (0.8910)  ( 0.8914)  ( 0.8914)
Others  0.4214***  0.0194 -0.0974 0.0838 -0.1079 -0.2186 -0.3967 0.3826  0.2114 
  (0.0080)  ( 0.9310)  ( 0.4880)  (0.4840)  ( 0.3838)  (0.1133 )  (0.2040)  ( 0.1327)  ( 0.6184)
R
2  0.049 0.040  0.078 
N. observ.  28450  16645  4871  67
Panel L: Thrift to be taught to children    
  Dominant religion: 
  Catholic Protestant  Muslim 
  Religious intensity  Religious intensity  Religious intensity 















            
Catholic 0.0141** 0.0233
*** 0.0253
***  0.0009  0.0080 -0.0005 -0.1060 -0.0018  0.0344 
  (0.0360)  (0.0020 )  (0.0011 )
   (0.9450)  (0.5382 )  (0.9722 )  (0.4050)  (0.9796 )  (0.5104 )
Protestant 0.0041  0.0326  -0.0015  0.0009  0.0232
**  -0.0075 0.4149* 0.1246  0.8019
***
  (0.8470)  ( 0.1507)  ( 0.9375)  (0.9190)  ( 0.0184)  ( 0.5449)  (0.0750)  ( 0.2933)  ( 0.0005)
Jew  0.0202 0.0232 0.2575 -0.0419  -0.0463  -0.0386 0.3771 0.5313  -0.3958 
  (0.8580)  ( 0.8395)  ( 0.1617)  (0.5440)  ( 0.5005)  ( 0.6117)  (0.3910)  ( 0.1192)  ( 0.4117)
Muslim  0.0194 0.0006 0.0632 -0.0048  -0.0830  -0.1791
*  0.0598***  0.0657
***  -0.0086 
  (0.8080)  ( 0.9953)  ( 0.5701)  (0.9550)  ( 0.3367)  ( 0.0681)  (0.0010)  ( 0.0037)  ( 0.7107)
Hindu  0.0312 0.0052 -0.0095 0.1497 0.1005 0.0967 0.0173  0.1552
*  0.0544 
  (0.7630)  ( 0.9715)  ( 0.8712)  (0.1150)  ( 0.2777)  (0.3113 )  (0.7970)  ( 0.0566)  ( 0.4205)
Buddhist  -0.0317 -0.1068 -0.0738 0.2119  0.0788  0.0800 0.5063* 0.5063
* 0.5063
* 
  (0.7940)  ( 0.6469)  ( 0.6120)  (0.1300)  ( 0.5322)  ( 0.7047)  (0.0700)  ( 0.0695)  (0.0695 )
Others -0.0089 0.0282 -0.0373 0.0322 0.0213 -0.0243 -0.0730 -0.0279  0.0786 
  (0.7270)  (0.4221 )  (0.1011 )  (0.1530)  ( 0.3728)  ( 0.3376)  (0.2460)  ( 0.5845)  (0.3571 )
R
2  0.078 0.147  0.077 
N. observ.  37635  25335  5010 
Panel M: Poor are lazy  
  Dominant religion: 
  Catholic Protestant  Muslim 
  Religious intensity  Religious intensity  Religious intensity 















            
Catholic  -0.0057 0.0014 0.0043 0.0082  0.0249
*** 0.0179
**  -0.2196*  0.1721
***  0.0665 
  (0.1430)  (0.7343 )  (0.3259 )  (0.2760)  (0.0014 )  (0.0234 )  (0.0710)  (0.0062 )  (0.1737 )
Protestant  0.0074 0.0062 0.0135  0.0109**  0.0171
*** 0.0312
***  -0.0818 -0.0687  0.0303 
  (0.5380)  ( 0.6303)  ( 0.2163)  (0.0360)  ( 0.0037)  (0.0000 )  (0.6910)  ( 0.3227)  ( 0.8789)
Jew  0.0117 0.0381 0.1269 0.0165 0.0094 0.0003 0.0213 -0.1055  0.9095
** 
  (0.8560)  ( 0.5611)  ( 0.2246)  (0.6900)  ( 0.8181)  ( 0.9952)  (0.9550)  ( 0.7206)  ( 0.0293)
Muslim -0.0534  -0.0257 0.1535
**  0.0453 0.0410  0.1042
*  0.0807***  0.1192
*** 0.1114
***
  (0.2390)  ( 0.6927)  ( 0.0152)  (0.3850)  ( 0.4355)  ( 0.0757)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)
Hindu -0.1541**  -0.0395 -0.0475  0.1825***  0.1898
*** 0.1800
***  0.1523** -0.0413  0.1567
***
  (0.0100)  ( 0.6694)  ( 0.1547)  (0.0010)  ( 0.0005)  (0.0014 )  (0.0100)  ( 0.5587)  ( 0.0080)
Buddhist  -0.0014 -0.0061 0.1134 -0.0605 -0.0956 0.1067  0.1373  0.1373  0.1373 
  (0.9840)  ( 0.9630)  (0.1966 )  (0.4640)  ( 0.1984)  ( 0.3915)  (0.6420)  ( 0.6416)  ( 0.6416)
Others -0.0054  0.0522
*** 0.0284
**  0.0441***  -0.0336
** 0.1038
***  0.0066 0.0124  -0.0045 
  (0.7110)  ( 0.0098)  ( 0.0298)  (0.0010)  ( 0.0188)  ( 0.0000)  (0.9090)  ( 0.7907)  ( 0.9558)
R
2  0.278 0.273  0.093 
N. observ.  37421 24562  4580 
    68
Table 6. Post Concilium  
Each panel reports the coefficients of an OLS regression, whose dependent variable is indicated at the top of the panel. dependent 
variables are defined in the legend of Table 1. Regressions include (coefficients not reported) the same demographic controls as in Table 
2 (health, male, age, education, social class, income), an indicator variable equal to 1 if a person answers no to the question “Do you 
believe in God?”, country fixed effects, and survey-year dummies. *** indicate the coefficient is different from zero at the 1 percent 
level, ** at the 5 percent level , and * at the 10 percent level.  






















*** 0.0014** 0.0081** -0.0435**  Raised Catholic 
(0.0061) (0.0044) (0.0049) (0.0034) (0.0197) (0.0118) (0.0120) 




***  (Raised + Currently) Catholic 






***  (Raised + Currently + Actively) 
Catholic  (0.0000) (0.0374) (0.5301) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Post concilium   -0.0192*** 0.0143*** 0.0091
*** 0.0108*** 0.0328** 0.0598*** 0.0408***
  (0.0051) (0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0027) (0.0136) (0.0097) (0.0099) 
0.0062
*** -0.0057
*** -0.0190*** -0.0147*** 0.0106**  0.0619**  0.0846*** Raised Catholic X Post 
concilium   (0.0093) (0.0067) (0.0076) (0.0052) (0.0270) (0.0179) (0.0181) 
0.0076 0.0002 0.0052  -0.0111**  -0.0084  0.0328
* 0.0122  (Raised + Currently Catholic) 
X Post concilium  (0.4175) (0.9734) (0.4914) (0.0333) (0.7331) (0.0671) (0.5037) 
-0.0031 -0.0029  0.0177**  -0.0188
*** 0.0955
*** 0.0413** -0.0443**  (Raised + Currently + Actively 
Catholic) X Concilium  (0.7608) (0.6970) (0.0389) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0342) (0.0261) 
Number of obs.  91656 89530 85614 84179 47667 87680 88124 
R squared  0.094 0.074 0.071 0.273 0.133 0.172 0.198 
Panel B: Attitudes toward women 
  When jobs are 
scarce, men 
should have 
more right to a 
job than women
Do you think 
that women 
should have 
children in order 
to be fulfilled 
Being a 
housewife is just 
as fulfilling as 










for a boy than 
for a girl 
0.1054**  0.0207***  0.0870** 0.0611** 0.0267**  Raised Catholic 





*** 0.0441**  (Raised + Currently) Catholic 






***  (Raised + Currently + Actively) 
Catholic  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Post concilium   0.0292** -0.0051
*** 0.0293** 0.0516** -0.0307** 
  (0.0113) (0.0051) (0.0112) (0.0124) (0.0155) 
-0.0954** -0.0024
*** -0.0912** -0.0989** 0.0093**  Raised Catholic X Post 





* 0.0093  (Raised + Currently Catholic) 





*** 0.0104  (Raised + Currently + Actively 
Catholic) X Concilium  (0.0000) (0.0026) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.7065) 
Number of obs.  72186 88240 68481 38851 38148 
R squared  0.139 0.250 0.101 0.086 0.123 
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Panel C: Attitudes toward legal rules  
 Trust  the 
legal system?






Is it justified 




Is it justified 
to cheat on 
taxes? 
Is it justified 







0.0187** -0.0398**  -0.2140*** -0.1245*** -0.1362*** -0.0468**  Raised Catholic 





*** -0.0319  (Raised + Currently) Catholic 






***  (Raised + Currently + Actively) 
Catholic  (0.0000) (0.0144) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0001) 
Post concilium   0.0484***  0.1347** 0.3127** 0.1268** 0.2423**  0.1422** 
  (0.0098) (0.0259) (0.0272) (0.0283) (0.0194)  (0.0192) 
0.0365** -0.0881** -0.0047** -0.0640*  0.0073**  -0.0945**  Raised Catholic X Post 
concilium   (0.0180) (0.0469) (0.0493) (0.0513) (0.0351)  (0.0348) 
-0.0176 -0.0006  -0.1715
*** -0.1287**  -0.0677
* -0.0377  (Raised + Currently Catholic) 






***  (Raised + Currently + Actively 
Catholic) X Concilium  (0.5720) (0.0045) (0.0553) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0054) 
         
Number of obs.  88157 86095 87224 86627 87356  87082 
R squared  0.092 0.095 0.126 0.099 0.073  0.070 
 
 
Panel D: Attitudes toward then market 
  Inequality of income vs. 
incentives  
Private vs. public 
ownership  
Competition is good or 
harmful 
-0.0176** 0.0638**  0.2218**  Raised Catholic 
(0.0482) (0.0466)  (0.0422) 
-0.0458 0.2776
*** 0.228
***  (Raised + Currently) Catholic 
(0.3285) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
-0.0375 0.443
*** 0.265
***  (Raised + Currently + 
Actively) Catholic  (0.4249) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Post concilium   0.0914** 0.1932**  0.0962** 




*  Raised Catholic X Post 
concilium   (0.0721) (0.0696)  (0.0630) 
0.0237 -0.3931
*** -0.2924
***  (Raised + Currently Catholic) 
X Post concilium  (0.7199) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
-0.0279 -0.5602
*** -0.3042
***  (Raised + Currently + Actively 
Catholic) X Concilium  (0.7097) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
      
Number of obs.  69016 66833  68177 





Panel D: Attitudes toward thriftiness and market’s fairness  










Poor are lazy 
0.0076
*** -0.0145** 0.0419**  -0.0769**  0.0002
***  Raised Catholic 




*** 0.0304  0.0129
***  (Raised + Currently) Catholic 





***  (Raised + Currently + Actively) 
Catholic  (0.2402) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Post concilium   -0.0042
*** 0.0786** 0.1000**  -0.0097**  0.0215*** 





* -0.0159***  Raised Catholic X Post 
concilium   (0.0095) (0.0700) (0.0719)  (0.0707)  (0.0058) 
0.0200** -0.1514**  0.0978  0.0714  -0.0189
***  (Raised + Currently Catholic) 
X Post concilium  (0.0377) (0.0177) (0.1375)  (0.2697)  (0.0012) 
0.0214** -0.1722** 0.1590** -0.0447  -0.0267
***  (Raised + Currently + Actively 
Catholic) X Concilium  (0.0440) (0.0142) (0.0334)  (0.5424)  (0.0000) 
         
Number of obs.  88696 71970 69198  67327  86305 
R squared  0.112 0.159 0.083  0.045  0.235 
 